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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THREE ESSAYS ON WELFARE POLICIES IN AMERICAN STATES:
EXPLAINING AMERICAN WELFARE STATES IN THE
POST-WELFARE REFORM ERA
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies that address questions
regarding state welfare policy making in the post-welfare reform era. The first empirical
study pays close attention to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) as a
federal block grant program, which is a big departure from most previous TANF studies,
to ask why American states differ in their decisions to allocate federal block grants across
specific programs. Drawing on research on fiscal federalism and state and cross-national
welfare politics, the study uses cross-sectional time-series data covering 50 states over
the fiscal years 2004-2016 to examine factors that have an impact on state child care
spending under the TANF block grant. The results show that several political factors and
one socio-economic factor impact states’ TANF child care spending in the hypothesized
direction. Most importantly, the study finds that a specific state government’s TANF
policy designed to encourage work matters in an interesting way. States’ emphasis on
work of TANF recipients, measured by the existence of the TANF job-search rule, exerts
a positive, independent effect on the percentage of state TANF child care spending, but
the positive marginal effect of implementing the job-search rule becomes negative as the
percentage of female state legislators passes 28%. The study shed lights on our general
understanding of the factors that influence state allocations of federal block grants for an
understudied but increasingly important policy program in the American states—child
care.
The second empirical study examines whether the selection of indicators of
welfare policy commitment makes any difference for the findings in studies of the
determinants of state welfare policy. If so, what difference does it make? While scholars
of state welfare politics have long been making efforts to find better explanations for
variation in welfare policy across American states, the literature as a whole has paid little
attention to how differently scholars operationalize state welfare policy even though they
examine a variety of welfare policy measures. To address these questions, I estimate a
series of different panel data models with different measures of state welfare commitment
for the period after the welfare reform of 1996. Comparing the results across these
models shows that the choice of dependent variable measures affects the estimation

results, thereby suggesting that empirical findings are dependent upon the measure we
use. This finding not only shows that scholars need to be cautious in interpreting their
results but also opens up a new puzzle as to why a factor affects a particular welfare
measure but not others.
The last empirical study addresses the question: do the effects of party politics
differ across welfare policies? In answering this question, the study draws on the
literature on deservingness and social construction of target populations and hypothesizes
that party politics would play a differential role in explaining the generosity of different
welfare policies depending on the perceived deservingness of target populations. To test
this hypothesis, I estimate three models each for TANF, Supplemental Security IncomeState Supplements (SSI-S), and Medicaid generosity covering the period after the welfare
reform. I find that party politics still remains as an important predictor of state welfare
generosity, especially where welfare policy for the deserving poor and mixed population
in terms of its deservingness is concerned. Also, there are differential effects of party
politics across the welfare policies examined, but sometimes in an unexpected direction.
This study provides a valuable addition to the literature in that it updates and enriches our
understanding of welfare politics.

KEYWORDS: TANF Child Care Spending, Welfare Measures, Welfare Commitment
and Generosity, State Welfare Politics, Deservingness, Target
Populations
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of state welfare policy
making in the post-welfare reform era by broadening the limited scope of scrutiny in the
existing literature. The passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) has provided scholars a great opportunity to
examine the consequences of rendering states a wide discretion over designing and
implementing welfare programs, resulting in many studies over the past 20 years. Despite
this, however, the welfare scholarship has left out some important aspects in the realm of
welfare research. Paying attention to where relatively scarce attention has been made, all
three papers in the dissertation examine variation in welfare policy across American
states while providing a different focus in each paper.
In Chapter 2, I pay attention to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program and examine what factors explain the variation across states in the
emphasis on child care under TANF. To address this question, I estimate the model using
panel data covering 50 states over FY 2004-FY 2016 while paying particular attention to
the role of TANF policy and its interaction with the presence of female legislators in a
state. The analysis in the chapter extends the TANF scholarship in two ways. First,
recognizing that the previous scholarship has not evaluated TANF as a block grant
program, this study focuses on child care as one of the important spending categories
under TANF and asks why American states differ in their decisions to allocate TANF
funds to child care. Second, I turn our attention to TANF policy as one of the possible
factors explaining the TANF output. Scholars have focused on variation in TANF policy
1

across states as the phenomenon to be explained, but not a factor that could lead to
variation in the way states use TANF block grants. Therefore, I test whether the presence
of a job-search requirement for TANF cash benefit determines the percentage of total
federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care.
In Chapter 3, I investigate whether the choice of one state welfare commitment
measure instead of another as a dependent variable changes the results in analyses. This
question has not been discussed in the literature, but it is a fundamental question that can
have important implications for both state welfare policy making and the welfare politics
scholarship. Answering this question proceeds with the following three steps. I first
review previous studies to see how scholars have operationalized state welfare policy as a
dependent variable and whether they have found consistent findings across studies with
regard to the most frequently studied independent variables. Next, I discuss how we
might conceptualize welfare in the American context, which leads me to construct three
different measures of state welfare policy commitment that reflect a different scope of
welfare depending on how we define the concept. Finally, with these measures, I estimate
three models using panel data covering 50 states over FY 1999-FY 2010 and compare the
results across the models. The study in this chapter gives directions to future research by
opening up new questions as to why a certain factor matters for a particular kind of
welfare commitment measure but not others.
In Chapter 4, I ask whether the effect of party politics differs across welfare
policies, paying particular attention to the perceived deservingness of target populations
and its implication for state welfare generosity. I hypothesize that the influence of party
competition and party control on the generosity of welfare policies will differ depending

2

on the perceived deservingness of target populations. I test this hypothesis with three
welfare policies serving different target populations—i.e., TANF, Supplemental Security
Income-State Supplements (SSI-S), and Medicaid—and compare the results. This chapter
updates and expands the existing literature by addressing the old debate regarding party
politics and its relationship to state welfare policymaking. Concluding the dissertation,
the last chapter discusses the connections between two empirical studies in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2
DO GOVERNMENT POLICIES MATTER?
STATE CHILD CARE SPENDING UNDER THE
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM
2.1 Introduction
Why do states differ in their allocations of federal block grants to specific
programs? Students of fiscal federalism have long been interested in how states use
federal money rendered in the form of a block grant and how such programs influence
state policies and outcomes. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, also known as the 1996 Welfare Reform Act,
instituted a federal block grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
providing scholars ample opportunity to examine why states allocate funds differently.
However, aside from a few descriptive studies (Schott, Floyd, & Burnside, 2019), little
research attempts to explain the variation in TANF funding allocations across the states.
Instead, most scholarly interest has focused on explaining differences in total state TANF
spending (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006), the stringency of states’
TANF policies for benefits, eligibility, and sanctions (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Filindra,
2002; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001; Zedlewski, 1998) and variation in state
TANF policy outputs such as TANF children coverage or TANF cash generosity (Bentele
& Nicoli, 2012; Brunch, Meyers, & Gornick, 2018).
One important allocation choice involves the decision about child care spending.
Understanding TANF spending on child care across states and over time is important for
several reasons. The federal government and the states have put much more emphasis on
supporting child care with TANF funds since the passage of the welfare reform act
134

(Waldfogel, 2001). In fact, child care for low-income families is stated as one of the core
welfare reform areas together with basic assistance for families with children and workrelated activities or supports. Because TANF changed the emphasis from stay-at-home
parenting in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to working
as a requirement for receiving benefits, the provision of child care is a major issue for
moving people from assistance to work. From the point of view of the welfare recipient,
child care is such an important aspect of TANF because welfare recipients, mostly singlemother families, have difficulties seeking employment and securing child care at the
same time. Provision of child care can help recipients transition off welfare and make a
living.
The growing share spent on child care over time demonstrates that child care is an
important and timely issue; child care spending in total TANF funds almost doubled from
9.3 % in FY 1998 to 17 % in FY 2016 (U.S. HHS, 2019). Despite its growing
importance, however, the U.S. governments provide relatively little public assistance for
child care compared to many industrialized countries in Western Europe (Lokteff &
Piercy, 2012; Ng, 2006; White, 2009). Average total public spending on child care and
early childhood education of 32 OECD countries is 0.7% of GDP, while the U.S.
governments spend only 0.35 % of GDP. Among 31 OECD countries, the U.S. ranked
29th on this measure as of 2013 (OECD, 2016). Also, when only public child care
spending is compared, the U.S. is ranked at the bottom among the 23 OECD countries
compared (OECD, 2016).
Although more than 20 years have passed since the PRWORA was enacted, the
question of how different states allocate TANF funds to child care has received little

5

scholarly attention. The lack of attention is surprising because state governments are key
players in deciding how federal block grant funds under TANF are allocated. With
greater flexibility given to states, it was foreseeable that states would allocate and use
TANF funds in a varying manner. Figure 2.1 displays the trend in the percentage of
TANF funding spent on child care in five states. One can observe tremendous variation in
the way states spend TANF funds to child care over time. For example, Kansas and Idaho
spent a similar proportion of TANF funds on child care in FY 2004, 15.5% and 15.4%,
respectively. However, child care spending over the next 13 years proceeded along a very
different trajectory in these two states, with Kansas reducing such spending to 4.3% in
FY 2013 while Idaho was increasing that spending to 27.1% in the same year. The
dramatic differences raise the question of what accounts for such wide variation across
states over time in their TANF spending on child care.
Drawing from research on fiscal federalism and state and cross-national welfare
politics, I develop several hypotheses about how different types of factors should
influence state TANF spending on child care and why some states would spend more
than others on child care over the time period examined. By studying TANF child care
spending, this research not only contributes to our general understanding of the factors
that influence different state spending of federal block grants, but also more specifically
our understanding of an understudied but increasingly important policy program in the
American states—child care. More specifically, this study examines the power of various
factors that influence state TANF child care spending with an emphasis on state TANF
policy as a potential driving force of variation in TANF child care spending across states.

6

Figure 2.1 The share of TANF funds spent on child care in five states, FY 2004-FY 2016
Note: The Y-axis represents the proportion of state TANF funds spent on child care, and the X-axis represents
fiscal years.
Source: The authors' calculation based on Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) TANF data and
TANF expenditure data collected by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHH).

2.2 Why do States Differ in Their Welfare Policies and Spending?
2.2.1 Political and Socio-Economic Factors
State welfare politics literature has mainly payed attention to two groups of
factors to explain variation in welfare policies across states: political and socio-economic
variables. States’ TANF child care spending can be also thought of as governments’
response to different kinds of political and socio-economic conditions that are generally
outside of state governments’ direct control. First, students of state welfare politics have
examined citizen’s policy preferences or broad ideological orientation as a driving force
7

of variation and changes in state policy. A few scholars find that this political force from
below is one of the critical factors that influence welfare policy and the level of welfare
expenditures in states (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004;
Filindra 2012; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997; Soss et al., 2001).
Implicit in the argument that state governments respond to preferences of their citizens is
that state governments make policy choices in a democratic political system in which
state citizens elect state policy makers who are expected to represent citizens’ policy
preferences (Powell, 2004). A few studies test this democratic responsiveness of
government by looking at the correspondence between state public ideology and the
ideological leaning of state public policy. Among others, Erikson and his colleagues,
using a composite measure of eight policies issues including AFDC, make a convincing
argument that public opinion is important and is even a more important factor than
socioeconomic factors in explaining state policy choices. They argue that the electoral
process works to transform citizens’ policy preferences into state policy; a more liberal
public ideology leads to more liberal state policies under certain conditions (Erikson et
al., 1993). Several subsequent studies also found a positive association between state
citizens’ ideology and state welfare policy (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; Fellow & Rowe,
2004; Ringquist et al., 1997; Soss et al., 2001).
The ideological leaning of state governments—i.e., state governments’ ideology
or the partisan control of government— is another widely examined political factor that
has been found to impact state welfare policy making. Although scholars do not agree on
how to operationalize these concepts (Brown, 1995; Smith, 1997), they nevertheless
matter. Liberal state governments tend to be more generous in assisting the poor than
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their conservative counterparts, in part, because they are elected by more liberal
constituents. Consequently, they spend more welfare money, allocate greater benefits,
and have less restrictive benefit eligibility rules (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Flavin, 2015;
Hill & Leighly, 1992; Rom, 1999; Smith, 1997; Soss et al., 2001).
Also, both state-level and cross-national studies show evidence that female
legislators tend to give more priority to women’s interests and voice liberal opinions on a
wide array of issues compared to their male counterparts (Barrett, 1995; CAWP, 2001;
Poggione, 2004; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Thomas & Welch, 1991; Welch, 1985).
Gender differences in legislators’ policy preferences come from different experiences and
responsibilities women have in their private sphere (Mandel & Dodson, 1993).
Poggione’s (2004) study, which uses survey data to examine welfare policy preferences
of female and male state legislators, shows that female legislators are more likely to hold
liberal preferences on welfare policy than their counterparts. Investigating states’ TANF
policy adoption following the welfare reform, Payne (2013) finds that states with higher
percentage of female legislators are likely to create a more progressive welfare
environment than those with lower percentage of female legislators. Moreover,
Hawkesworth and her colleagues document that female legislators made efforts to expand
the proposed PRWORA to include child care provisions in the process of drafting and
developing the bill (Hawkesworth, Casey, Jenkins, & Kleeman, 2001).
Socio-economic factors compose a second group of factors that scholars consider
in explaining variation in state welfare policy. A functionalist argument that societal
needs for welfare are associated with an expansion of welfare programs is well received
in the welfare development literature. Focusing on variation in welfare service provision
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in post-industrial democracies, comparative national studies demonstrate that new social
needs give rise to an expansion of welfare programs (Bonoli & Reber, 2010; Wilensky,
1975). Scholars consider this factor in the American states’ context as well, but with two
conflicting expectations. While some scholars hypothesize that social needs should be
positively associated with state welfare policy (Fry & Winter, 1970), others predict that
states may get tougher to counter the growing welfare dependency in their states with less
generous welfare policy (Soss et al., 2001). Based on these contradictory arguments,
Fellowes and Rowe (2004) posit that social needs could have either positive or negative
influence on state welfare policy. Findings from these studies are mixed, but overall
suggest that societal needs matter for welfare policy in the states. Whereas Soss et al.
(2001) only find a partial support for their thesis, Fry and Winters (1970) and Fellowes
and Rowe (2004) find evidence to support the positive influence of social needs factors
on state welfare policy. Fellowes and Rowe (2004) show that states respond to a higher
level of welfare needs by providing more generous cash benefits and implementing less
restrictive eligibility policy. They argue that their findings on welfare demand indicate
that policy makers react compassionately toward those in need of assistance.
Many studies investigate the racial composition of state population or welfare
recipients as an important predictor of welfare policy across states. Since Wright (1977)
first found the backlash effect of African-American state population on AFDC
generosity, numerous studies have tested whether the backlash effect is also present in
different policy contexts (Avery & Peffley, 2005; Bentele & Nicoli, 2012; Matsubayashi
& Rocha, 2012; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). The negative relationship
between black population or black welfare recipients and state welfare policy is found
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both in pre 1996 welfare reform (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Plotnick &
Winters, 1985) and post 1996 welfare reform era (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Reingold &
Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). Also, a study that examines the period that spans before
and after the welfare reform in 1996 reports that the size of black population has a
negative impact on state total welfare expenditures (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012).
These findings regarding each of these political and socio-economic forces lead us to
expect that variations in citizen ideology, government ideology, female legislators,
societal needs, and the proportion of racial minorities among TANF recipients will affect
the spending of TANF funds.
2.2.2 A Missing Piece: State TANF Policies as State Policy Intentions
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) devolved program authority to state governments, which created a policy
environment where states could perform as laboratories of democracy. Therefore, the
passage of welfare reform triggered much scholarly interest in state welfare politics,
particularly focusing on state TANF policies, such as eligibility and sanctioning rules and
cash benefit levels. Central to this interest has been seeking an answer to the question of
why some states adopt more generous TANF policies than other states. However, only a
few studies focus on spending aspects of the TANF block grant (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014;
Rodgers & Tedin, 2006), and those studies are limited in the following respects. First,
these studies examine cross-state variation in a highly aggregated level of TANF
expenditures—i.e., total TANF expenditures used by states, but do not look at categories
or subcategories under the TANF block grant. Investigating TANF spending as a whole
might show us a general picture of why total TANF spending varies across states.
11

However, since expenditure categories on which states spend TANF money are not
identical in the proportion of TANF spending allocated to the category, lumping TANF
funds together obscures what might matter for a particular spending category, such as
child care spending. Second and more importantly, previous studies that examine TANF
spending levels tend to ignore the effect of state TANF policies on policy output. State
TANF policies are examined exclusively as dependent variables, but previous studies do
not consider the possibility of state TANF policies having an impact on the pattern of
state TANF expenditures. 1
Findings from the literature on the effects of federal block grants on state
spending show that states do shape the distribution of grants in a certain direction
(Fossett, 1987; Jacobsen & McGuire, 1996; Morgan & England, 1984). Also, studies
buttress this finding by showing that states’ TANF policies vary in terms of generosity to
welfare recipients and that state TANF policy designs reflect the intentions of policy
makers in response to growing caseloads (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001).
These findings suggest, therefore, leaving out state TANF policies from a model would
provide an incomplete story as to why states vary in their support for a particular program
or a level of spending under a federal block grant. As states have great latitude to design
their TANF programs and tailor their welfare spending to the particular needs of the state,
state TANF policies represent intentions of state policy makers. For example, state
governments could use welfare policy as an instrument to discourage citizens’ behavior
that is considered counter-normative, such as welfare dependency (Gans, 1995; Handler,

1

While Rodgers and Tedin (2006) suggest that strict TANF policy has influence on state TANF tax effort
across states, they do not include a state TANF policy variable in their preferred specification model.
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1995). Therefore, examining underlying state policy intentions as an explanatory factor
would provide a more comprehensive explanation of variation across state welfare
policy—in this case, TANF child care spending—over time. In this paper, I incorporate a
state TANF policy that is relevant to TANF child care spending as a possible explanatory
variable, emphasizing more intentional and active use of welfare policy by states.
In this regard, this study contributes to the literature on state welfare policy by
looking at a relatively neglected aspect of the TANF block grant by focusing on TANF
child care spending. TANF child care spending is worthy of scholars’ attention, given
that (1) TANF child care spending level ranks the second highest among other categories
of spending under the TANF block grant and (2) that child care support can be critical to
welfare recipients’ efforts to improve their family’s well-being and attain self-sufficiency. 2

2.3 Explaining TANF Child Care Spending Across the States
This section develops several hypotheses about the factors that influence TANF
child care spending in the states. The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA or the Personal Responsibility Act) was a
watershed moment in the history of American welfare policy. Passing with a relatively
high degree of bipartisan support, the Personal Responsibility Act aimed to “end welfare
as we know it” by addressing critical issues that have been a focus of debate about
welfare in America. To this end, the legislation replaced the federal Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) program—the primary cash assistance program for lowincome families—with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)

2

Next to spending on basic assistance, which comprises 24% of the total federal and state TANF fund,
child care spending amounts to 17% of the total at the aggregate level in FY 2016 (Schott et al., 2019).
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program—a state-managed block grant. One central component that distinguishes TANF
from previous welfare policy is that, in response to the criticism that governments’
welfare programs were increasing dependency instead of encouraging work, it puts heavy
emphasis on work and self-sufficiency. Therefore, the legislation set firm time limits on
welfare receipt, established work requirements, and allowed state governments to impose
much stricter work and work activity requirements in the hope of moving welfare
recipients toward employment. At the same time, states implemented a variety of services
to promote work, including education programs, job-search, and child care support.
Previous studies suggest that different levels of state welfare spending reflect
varying degrees of response to political and socio-economic forces (Ewalt & Jennings,
2014; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006). First, previous literature finds
that a more liberal citizen ideology leads to a higher level of spending on welfare
programs (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014). However, the current study cannot directly draw on
this finding because whether spending on child care denotes more welfare than spending
on all other spending categories under the TANF block grant is not straightforward. For
example, comparing child care spending and basic cash assistance spending, it is not
clear which one reflects a more liberal choice. However, public opinion studies find that
the more conservative citizens are, the more they tend to oppose an increase in
government spending on child care (Henderson, Monroe, Garand, & Burts, 1995). This
empirical finding suggests that states with a more liberal citizen ideology should be
expected to spend more TANF money on child care than states with a more conservative
ideology, which leads to the following hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: On average, states with a more liberal citizen ideology will spend a
higher proportion of total TANF spending on child care than more conservative
states.
As more conservative citizens oppose more support for child care (Henderson et
al., 1995), we can expect that more liberal governments that represent more liberal
citizens’ preferences will spend more TANF funds on child care than less liberal
governments. In addition, the fact that it was Democratic politicians not Republicans who
support funding child care with TANF money buttresses the above-stated expectation
(Cohen, 2001, p. 180). Therefore, the second hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 2: On average, state governments with a more liberal ideology will
spend a higher proportion of TANF on child care than states with a more
conservative government ideology.
Many studies on women in state legislatures argue that female legislators are
more likely than their male counterparts to express interest in representing women’s
interests. In a study of OECD countries, Bonoli and Reber (2010) found that female
representation in the national legislative body significantly and positively influenced
public spending on child care services. This study suggests that greater representation of
women in a policy making body will push states to spend more TANF funds on child
care, stated more formally in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: On average, states with a higher percentage of women in state
legislatures will spend a higher proportion of total TANF spending on child care
than states with a lower percentage of female legislators.
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Not only political forces but also societal needs are expected to influence TANF
spending on child care. With the increasing degree of maternal employment, policy
makers have been concerned that child care costs create a barrier to employment,
particularly for single mothers and low-skilled workers. This concern spurred a
considerable increase in public funding for child care assistance (Meyers, Heintze, &
Wolf, 2002). As a major welfare program that emphasizes “welfare-to-work”, TANF
programs are designed to promote employment of welfare recipients, and the TANF
block grant spent for child care is to support parents who work (non-assistance child care
spending) or seek work (assistance child care spending). Therefore, if a state observes
more need for child care support, the state would invest more on it.
This study uses three indicators to measure societal needs: unemployment rate,
unwed birth rate, and poverty rate. On the one hand, a higher unemployment rate in states
could lead to lower spending on child care as unemployment rate being high means fewer
women in the work force and less demand for labor which means there is less need for
child care assistance. On the other hand, it is likely that state governments push people to
work or work activity when the unemployment rate is low, trying to ease the pressures of
employers hiring workers in a tighter labor market (Soss et al., 2001), which would be
associated with higher spending on child care. A higher unwed birth rate indicates more
need for child care support. Single mothers are more likely to be in poverty; thus, they
need to look for jobs or participate in economic activities and are less capable of paying
for child care themselves. Therefore, this study posits the following hypotheses.
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Hypothesis 4-a: On average, states with a higher unemployment rate will have a
lower proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those
with lower unemployment rates.
Hypothesis 4-b: On average, states with a higher poverty rate will have a higher
proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those with
lower poverty rates.
Hypothesis 4-c: On average, states with a higher unwed birth rate will have a higher
proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those with
lower unwed birth rates.
Many scholars find evidence of racism as an explanation for state welfare policy
choices (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012;
Wright, 1977). Moreover, post welfare reform studies also report that states with a higher
percentage of African-American TANF recipients are less generous on welfare provisions
(Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001). Therefore, I expect that this biased attitude
toward black recipients would be applied to the case of TANF child care spending.
Hypothesis 5-a: On average, states with a higher percentage of African-Americans
among total TANF recipients will have a lower proportion of TANF child care
spending in total TANF spending than those with a lower percentage of AfricanAmerican TANF recipients.
Hypothesis 5-b: On average, states with a higher percentage of Hispanics among
total TANF recipients will have a lower proportion of TANF child care spending in
total TANF spending than those with a lower percentage of Hispanic TANF recipients.
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I argue that state TANF policies would have an impact on TANF outputs; in
particular, how states spend their TANF funds. States administer TANF funds applying a
variety of TANF policies (or rules), and these policies shape their TANF programs,
reflecting state intentions to make people behave in certain ways by implementing those
policies. As a greater percentage of TANF child care spending means more state effort to
facilitate employment, in other words, to discourage welfare dependency, this study
expects that the design and implementation of state TANF programs that put more
emphasis on work will lead to greater spending on TANF child care. Among several
candidates that could be used as an indicator of states’ TANF policy orientation regarding
an emphasis on work, this study utilizes data on a TANF policy that indicates whether a
job-search is required to be eligible for TANF in a given state. This policy reflects states’
policy intentions trying to encourage participation in the job market, which should, in
turn, increase state TANF spending on child care. States with this policy in place are
expected to spend more on child care than their counterparts. Therefore, this study posits
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: On average, states that require a job-search to be eligible for TANF
will spend a higher proportion of TANF on child care than states that do not require
a job-search.
Meanwhile, I expect that there is an interaction between the job-search rule and
female legislators. Depending on assumptions I make on how women legislators would
perceive the job-search rule, I posit two contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand,
women legislators might think the job-search rule as a policy design that increases the
demand for child care by emphasizing work, so they would exert more influence to
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increase spending on child care in the presence of such a rule. In this scenario, the
presence of job-search rule reinforces the effect of female legislators; also, female
legislators augment the effect of job-search rule. On the other hand, women legislators
might consider the job-search rule an institutional design that naturally increases TANF
spending on child care. In this case, they become relatively less attentive to supporting
child care need and thus motivation to increase child care spending is weakened.
Therefore, the presence of such rule would negate the effect of women legislators on
TANF child care spending. In the same vein, the effect of the job-search rule should
decrease when women legislator presence becomes stronger. Therefore, the two
hypotheses that follows are:
Hypothesis 7-a: On average, the impact of having a higher percentage of women
legislators in states will increase when states have the job-search rule; the impact of
the job-search rule will increase when there is a higher percentage of women
legislators.
Hypothesis 7-b: On average, the impact of having a higher percentage of women
legislators in states will decrease when state have the job-search rule; the impact of
the job-search rule will decrease when there is a higher percentage of women
legislators.
To test these hypotheses, I use panel data in 50 states from FY 2004 to FY 2016.
The following section discusses the dependent and independent variables and how I
operationalize the variables for the empirical test proposed in this study.
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2.4 Data and Measures
This study employs a regression analysis using panel data in 50 states for FY
2004-FY 2016 to examine the factors that influence state spending on child care under
the TANF block grant. While TANF financial data is available from late 1990’s, the data
availability for one control variable—i.e., Child Care Development Fund (CCDF)
Spending—restricts the time period of the study to start from FY 2004. I conduct the
analysis including dummies for each state and year. By including state dummy variables,
I assume that some invariant characteristics within the states may impact the independent
and the dependent variables. We can think of state culture as an example of a timeinvariant characteristic of states, with women in some states traditionally being more
likely to seek employment than in other states, which likely affects the outcome variable.
In addition, by including year dummies in the model, I intentionally remove the impact of
certain events that influence TANF child care spending across the board in most states.
For example, inclusion of year dummies controls the impact of the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. Through ARRA, the federal government
rendered an additional $5 billion in emergency contingency funds to states in 2009 and
2010, which increased TANF funds available for all states. Therefore, the regression
coefficients presented are the estimates controlling for both state and year fixed effects.
They reflect the degree of influence for each factor on the percentage of state TANF child
care spending, controlling for other independent variables, unobserved national time
trends, and invariant but unobserved state-specific characteristics within states.
TANF Child Care Spending is the dependent variable that measures the
percentage of total federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care by each state
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in each fiscal year. 3 States can spend the TANF funds, which consist of federal and state
funds, on 22 categories of activities, and the categories can be grouped into a higher level
of categories as shown in Table 2.1. 4 In this study, I include 1) direct child care spending
used with federal and state funds and 2) transfers of federal TANF funds to the Child
Care Development Fund (CCDF) to measure child care spending under TANF programs.
The CCDF is a primary federal fund that provides child care subsidies to low income
working families. The federal government limits CCDF transfers to 30 percent of total
federal TANF funds. 5 Theoretically, the measure of TANF child care spending ranges
from 0 to 100, but in reality the percentages range from -13.61 to 68.72. Since states are
allowed to make negative adjustment to previous expenditures, negative spending can
show up in TANF financial documents (Schott, Pavetti, & Floyd, 2015). Negative
spending reflects that there are changes in funding streams, funds are recovered from a
program, or funds are retrieved back from the CCDF to TANF (CBPP, n.d.).
The results presented in the main text are from the data set that treats negative
values as they are. 6 Assuming that there could be mistakes in data entry by administrative
staff (of state, federal offices, or both), I winsorize and truncate extreme values of the
dependent variable at 1 and 99 percentiles respectively to reduce the effect of possible
3

The data for this measure are from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) (CBPP, 2015) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The CBPP categorizes the TANF expenditure data
into a set of sub-categories using the data collected by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and released through the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) website. The OFA is one of the offices
in the Administration for Children and Families that administers TANF programs.
4
State governments are required to submit a Form ACF-196 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services each year on which they report how they spent the TANF block grant in these 22 categories of
spending.
5
A state can transfer federal TANF funds to Social Security Block Grant (SSBG) up to 10 percent of its
TANF funds. However, CCDF transfer together with SSBG transfer may not exceed 30 percent of a states’
current year block grant.
6
The panel data include five observations that have negative values for TANF Child Care Spending for
Arizona, Colorado (twice), Georgia, and South Dakota, in four different years from FY 2006 to FY 2014.
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Table 2.1 Categories of TANF Spending
Federal Reporting Category a
Basic Assistance
Assistance
Child Care b
Non-Assistance
Transferred to CCDF
Transportation and Other Supportive Services
Work Subsidies
Work Related
Education and Training
Activities/Expenses
Other Work Activities/Expenses
Job Access
Transportation
Other Transportation
Individual Development Accounts
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credit
Other Refundable Tax Credit
Assistance
Authorized Solely
Under Prior Law
Non-assistance
Other Non-Assistance
Administration
Systems
Prevention of Out of Wedlock Pregnancies
Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance
Transferred to SSBG
Non-Recurrent Short-Term Benefits

Authors’ Category
Basic Assistance
Child Care (Spent or Transferred)

Work-Related Activities & Supports

Refundable Tax Credit
Authorized Under Prior Law &
Other Non-Assistance
Administration & Systems
Prevention of Out of Wedlock
Pregnancies & Two-Parent Family
Formation and Maintenance
Transferred to SSBG
Non-Recurrent Short-Term Benefits

a. The Federal reporting category is slightly modified from FY 2015. However, since child care spending
and transfer to CCDF category exist as they used to be, the change in the reporting category does not affect
the way I generate child care category for the analysis.
b. All categories of spending except transferred fund to CCDF and Social Security Block Grant (SSBG) can
be classified as either assistance or non-assistance spending. Child care assistance is provided to families
that are not employed but participating in other work activities such as job-search, education, or training.
Child care non-assistance includes child care support for families who are employed, and that provided as a
non-recurrent, short-term benefit.

outliers made by chance, and discuss the results in Table A.2 in the Appendix A. To be
succinct, the main findings are robust to these changes to the dependent variable.
State TANF Policy is the main independent variable that captures whether a state
emphasizes work in its TANF policy design. This study uses a TANF rule that indicates
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whether a job-search is required either before or while their application is processed as a
condition to be eligible for aid in a given state as of July of each year. The variable takes
on a value of 1 if a state requires job-search, and 0 otherwise. Not only does this measure
vary across states, it also varies over time as states sometimes change their TANF
policies. 7
The political factors are as follows. Government Liberalism: This indicates the
relative liberalism of a state government. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording,
Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government
ideology, which indicates how close to the left state legislators and governors stand on
the ideological continuum. It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating a more
liberal government ideology. Citizen Liberalism: This is an independent variable that
measures the relative liberalism of citizens in each state. The data for this variable comes
from the revised citizen ideology series of Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson’s
(1998) study, which covers the period 1960-2016. 8 It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger
numbers reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. Female Legislators: This variable
indicates to what extent women are represented in state legislatures, which is measured as
the percentage of seats occupied by women in the state legislatures. 9
Socio-economic factors include three societal need variables and two racial
variables. First, societal needs are measured by the following: Unemployment Rate,
Poverty Rate, and Unwed Birth Rate. Unemployment Rate: It represents the annual
7

The data on this TANF rule are available from the Urban Institute website (http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd).
The data are available in Richard C. Fording’s personal website (https://rcfording.wordpress.com/stateideology-data/).
9
The data for this measure are taken from the Center for American Women and Politics’ (CAWP) annual
fact sheets on women in state legislatures (http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/fact-sheet-archive-women-statelegislatures).
8
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average percentage of people aged 16 and older in employment in each state. 10 Poverty
Rate: This variable measures the percentage of people living under a poverty threshold
defined by the Census Bureau. Unwed Birth Rate: It is measured as the proportion of all
births born to unwed women in each state, which also captures societal needs for child
care. 11 Next, I take into account African-American Recipients and Hispanic Recipients to
examine the probable impact of race on state TANF child care spending. These variables
measure the percentage of African-American TANF recipients and that of Hispanic
TANF recipients in total TANF recipients in each state. 12
In addition to the above predictors, this study includes the following two control
variables. TANF Caseload Change: This variable accounts for the varying degree of
increase or decrease in TANF caseloads across states and years. Studies report that states
were able to save TANF funds in the years after welfare reform due to a significant drop
in TANF rolls. Therefore, states are able to redirect TANF money previously spent for
cash assistance to other areas, including child care (Pavetti & Schott, 2011). A study that
examines transfer of TANF funds to the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) supports
this expectation (Lambright & Allard, 2004). The authors find that when states have more
surpluses of TANF funds due to decreased caseloads, they are likely to transfer more
TANF funds to SSBG. Altogether, these findings imply that a state with more TANF

10

The data for this measure come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment
Statistics. “States: Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population, 1976 to 2014 annual
averages” (https://www.bls.gov/lau/staadata.txt).
11
The information is taken from the Kids Count Data Center (http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data). Their
data on this variable are analyzed using data files from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
National Center for Health Statistics.
12
The data for this measure come from TANF caseload data for each year. They are released annually
through the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) website
(www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/programs/tanf/data-reports).
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surplus generated from reduced caseloads is also likely to spend more on child care. The
variable is measured as the percentage change in the total number of TANF families in
each state. 13 CCDF Spending: This measures states’ child care commitment outside of
TANF block grant. TANF families can receive child care subsidies through Child Care
Development Fund (CCDF) which is the largest source of child care subsidies for lowincome families. It is likely that states that spend more on CCDF programs are
systematically different from those that put less resources on the programs. Therefore, I
include state total expenditures on CCDF programs as a control.
Except for State TANF Policy, all the other independent variables are lagged by
one year. As the dependent variable, TANF Child Care Spending, uses fiscal year data, it
is more reasonable to match it with lagged independent variables. In this way, I can avoid
a possibility of reverse causality. Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics of variables
estimated in this study.
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for FY 2004-FY 2016
Variable
TANF Child Care Spending (%)
State TANF Policy (0/1)
Female Legislators (%)
Citizen Liberalism (0-100)
Government Liberalism (0-100)
Unemployment Rate (%)
Unwed Birth Rate (%)
Poverty Rate (%)
TANF Caseload Change (%)
African-American Recipients (%)
Hispanic Recipients (%)
CCDF Spending ($1,000)

13

Obs
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650
650

Mean
17.27
0.37
23.54
51.88
46.16
6.15
38.33
12.84
-3.30
33.66
16.00
47,200

The data from the OFA website are used to construct this variable.
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Std. Dev.
12.96
0.48
6.94
15.78
15.88
2.06
6.75
3.25
11.10
25.75
16.81
78,200

Min
-13.61
0
8.20
13.48
17.51
2.60
17.20
5.40
-43.54
0.79
0.17
-28,900

Max
68.72
1
42.00
94.95
73.62
13.70
55.00
23.10
53.67
85.55
73.30
1,210,000

2.5 Results
Table 2.3 gives the empirical results from the multivariate regression analysis using
the panel data covering 50 states over the fiscal years 2004-2016 with year and state
dummies. Estimates from the model support some of the hypotheses. Most importantly, it
shows that State TANF Policy and Female Legislators interact with each other to make
differences in TANF Child Care Spending and the effect from the interaction is
statistically significant (p<0.01). The presence of the job-search rule and the percentage
of female legislators exert a positive, independent impact on TANF child care spending
and they are also conditioned by each other as I expected. It turns out, in fact, that State
TANF Policy and Female Legislators make the influence from each other less effective.
Note that the coefficient for State TANF Policy only represents the marginal effect of the
job-search rule when the percentage of female legislators is held constant at zero.
Because the female legislators variable ranges approximately from 8 to 42 percent in my
sample, holding this variable at zero does not reflect the real world. Therefore, in
interpreting the results, we should take into account the moderating effect of Female
Legislators on State TANF Policy instead of looking at the main effect of State TANF
Policy. Similarly, the coefficient for Female Legislators shows the marginal effect of the
percentage of female legislators when states do not have the job-search rule at all.
Therefore, when we discuss the marginal effect of Female Legislators on TANF child
care spending, the moderating effect of State TANF Policy on Female Legislators must
enter our calculation (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006).
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Table 2.3 Determinants of State TANF Child Care Spending, FY 2004-FY 201614
Variables
Interaction
State TANF Policy * Female Legislators

Expected Direction

Model

+/−

-0.38***
(0.13)

Government Policy
State TANF Policy

+

8.47***
(2.87)

Political Factors
Female Legislators

+

Citizen Liberalism

+

Government Liberalism

+

0.27**
(0.12)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.09***
(0.03)

Socio-Economic Factors
Unemployment Rate

+/−

Unwed Birth Rate

+

Poverty Rate

+

African-American Recipients

−

Hispanic Recipients

−

Controls
TANF Caseload Change

+

CCDF Spending a

−

Constant

-0.55*
(0.30)
-0.16
(0.23)
0.19
(0.23)
0.04
(0.11)
0.35***
(0.11)
-0.03
(0.03)
6.85e-09***
(2.53e-09)
-0.45
(12.46)

Observations
Number of State
Years
R-squared

650
50
13
0.84

Note: Entries are coefficients estimated from a multivariate regression model with state and year dummies.
The dependent variable is the percentage of total federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care
14

One might think that competition between a state and its neighbors could play a role here. However,
including neighbors’ effect measured as the average percentage of neighbors’ TANF child care spending in
their total TANF funds does not make much difference in the results. The coefficient of neighbors’ effect is
0.0003 and it is not statistically significant even with the 10% confidence level. In addition, doing so does
not add to the variance explained by the model.
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plus transfers to CCDF for each state in each fiscal year. All independent variables are tested against a twosided alternative. Except for State TANF Policy variable, all the other independent variables are lagged by
one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. The coefficient for CCDF Spending is statistically significant at the 1% level, but its size is minuscule.
Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the result that CCDF Spending does not have a substantive marginal
effect on TANF Child Care Spending.

To visualize how the marginal effect of State TANF Policy on the proportion of
TANF child care spending changes at varying percentage of female legislators, I contrast
in Figure 2.2 the marginal effect of State TANF Policy on the share of TANF child care
spending at various percentage of Female Legislators with 95% confidence intervals.
This shows what the average percentage of TANF child care spending would have been if
all states had had the rule (and keeping the other variables constant at their means) versus
if all states had not had the rule in place at different values of Female Legislators. As the
percentage of female legislators increases, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy
decreases at a rate of 0.38, meaning that 1% increase in female legislators leads to 0.38%
decrease in TANF child care spending. However, the marginal effect of State TANF
Policy is pronounced in states with either a higher or a lower level of women
representation. There is a certain threshold that flips the contrast. When the percentage of
female legislators are fewer than 16%, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy is
positive and statistically different from zero (p<0.05); when states have more than 28% of
female legislators, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy is negative and statistically
significant (p<0.05). Having the job-search rule is associated with a 2.5% to 5.4% greater
percentage of TANF child care spending when state have relatively low presence of
female legislators, while it leads to a smaller share of TANF child care spending by 2.7%
to 7 %.
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Figure 2.2 Marginal effects of state TANF policy conditional on female state legislators
Note: The X-axis shows the percentage of women legislators, and the Y-axis shows the differences in state
TANF child care spending when states have a job-search rule versus when they do not have the rule
(baseline). The differences are statistically significant until the 95% confidence interval line touches the
zero reference line.

This empirical result suggests two interesting stories as to how State TANF Policy
and Female Legislators variables interact in explaining TANF Child Care Spending.
First, the results imply that when there is a smaller percentage of female legislators,
which is under 16%, the presence of the job-search rule guarantees some level of child
care spending under the TANF programs, which results in a greater percentage of child
care spending than when there is no such rule in states. Second, the analysis shows that
there is a certain threshold that flips the contrast. When there is a greater percentage of
female legislators, which is approximately above 28%, the absence of the job-search
requirement motivates women legislators to support more child care spending which is
more than what states would spend when they have the job-search requirement. Spending
29

a higher percentage of TANF fund on child care becomes feasible because there is a
greater percentage of female legislators who presumably vote for more child care
spending.
Figure 2.3 depicts the marginal effect of Female Legislators on TANF child care
spending conditional on the presence of State TANF Policy with 95% confidence
intervals. It shows that the marginal effect of Female Legislators is positive (β=0.27) and
statistically significant (p<0.05) when State TANF Policy is zero, while the marginal
effect is negative (β=-0.12) but statistically insignificant (p=-0.92) when State TANF
Policy is one. This result indicates that 1% increase in female legislators increases the
percentage of TANF child care spending by 0.27% when states do not have the jobsearch rule; however, having the job-search rule essentially makes the influence from
having 1% more female legislators on state TANF child care spending close to zero. In
other words, whether or not the percentage female legislators is substantively important
in determining state TANF child care spending depends on whether states already have
the TANF policy that potentially increases TANF spending on child care.
The result can be interpreted in the following two ways. It could be that the
influence from female legislators is more effective when there is no job-search rule since
the absence of the job-search requirement may motivate female legislators to support
more child care spending under the TANF programs, as demonstrated by the statistically
significant coefficient of Female Legislators (β=0.27, p<0.01). Therefore, having a
higher percentage of female legislators leads to a higher percentage of spending on
TANF child care when there is no job-search rule in place. In the same vein, it is likely
that female legislators do not make extra efforts to support more child care spending
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Figure 2.3 Marginal effects of female state legislators conditional on state TANF policy
Note: The Y-axis shows the presence of State TANF Policy (i.e., job-search rule), and the X-axis shows the
effect of an increase in female legislators by 1% on the percentage of state TANF child care spending. The
marginal effect of female legislators is statistically significant if the 95% confidence interval line does not
touch the zero reference line.

acknowledging that there is a state TANF policy that is, by design, potentially associated
with more state TANF spending on child care. Under the circumstances where the jobsearch rule is already in place, a state having 1% more female legislators does not make
any difference in its TANF child care spending.
To sum, the findings suggests that State TANF Policy and Female Legislators
substitute for each other in a rather interesting way. Having the TANF policy that
requires recipients to search for a job leads to a greater spending on TANF child care than
in the absence of such policy only when there are relatively few female legislators; up to
the point where female legislators occupy 16% of state legislative seats, the marginal
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effect of State TANT Policy is positive and decreases as the percentage of female
legislators increases. However, when female legislators increase beyond 28% of state
legislators, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy becomes negative and increases as
Female Legislators increase. It means that not having the TANF policy requiring a jobsearch results in a higher percentage of TANF spending on child care when the
percentage of female legislators are relatively high. Meanwhile, the positive marginal
impact of women’s representation in state legislatures is offset by the presence of jobsearch rule.
Other political factors—i.e., Citizen Liberalism and Government Liberalism—turn
out to be statistically significant in the expected direction. The regression coefficient of
Citizen Liberalism is 0.12 (p<0.05), which means that as a state’s citizens becomes more
liberal by one point, the percentage TANF child care spending increases by 0.12% in a
state. The regression coefficient of Government Liberalism is 0.09, which implies that as
a state government becomes more liberal by one point, there is 0.09 % increase in the
share of TANF child care expenditure in a state, ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, among the
socio-economic factors, Hispanic Recipients is statistically significant (p<0.01) and has a
positive effect as hypothesized. As a state has more Hispanic recipients of TANF by 1%,
it is likely that it spends 0.35% more child care spending under TANF programs. It is
important to note that none of the social need factors—i.e., Unemployment Rate, Unwed
Birth Rate, and Poverty Rate—explains variation in state TANF child care spending.

2.6 Concluding Remarks
This study uses cross-sectional time-series data covering 50 states over the fiscal
years 2004-2016 to examine the factors that influence the share of state spending on child
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care under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It departs
from most previous studies conducted since the welfare reform of 1996. First, this study
pays attention to the nature of a block grant which renders great latitude to states to
design their programs and spend money accordingly. While previous studies take
advantage of the welfare reform of 1996 to investigate variations in state TANF policies
and practices, including strictness/generosity and sanctions, I shift our attention to
existing variations in the way states allocate and spend TANF funds, focusing on TANF
child care spending, which is a timely social policy topic. Second, this study presents a
mechanism through which a specific state-level TANF policy choice affects state TANF
output. Many scholars have studied state TANF policy as a variable to be explained, but
there has been no attempt to consider a possibility of state TANF policy having an effect
on TANF outputs across states. Arguably, together with other factors, the policy intention
of state governments in an attempt to shape people’s behavior in certain directions is one
of the important factors that predicts how states spend their TANF funds. Therefore, this
study builds a theoretical framework to take into account a state TANF policy that
emphasizes work to examine state TANF child care spending. As states emphasize work,
they will use resources—i.e., TANF funds—to promote work. As a result, states will
spend more on child care under TANF. In addition, I theorize that the state TANF policy
interacts with female legislators to increase state TANF child care spending.
I show that states’ emphasis on work of TANF recipients, measured by the
existence of the TANF job-search rule, has a statistically significant, independent effect
on the percentage of state child care spending under TANF and the effect of having the
job-search rule is conditioned by the percentage of female legislators in a state. More
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specifically, while having the job-search rule exerts an independent effect of increasing
the percentage of state TANF child care spending, the marginal effect of implementing
the rule changes as the percentage of female state legislators increases. As a result, the
marginal effect of the job-search rule remains positive up to the point where women
legislators hold seats by 16%, but the effect becomes negative once there is more than
28% female legislators in a state.
These findings represent an important contribution to our understanding of an
understudied aspect of TANF and provide directions to future studies. When states are
freed to allocate and spend block grant funds under minimal federal guidelines, the way
states design their policy can affect welfare recipients’ experience with TANF. In
addition, state policy might not be tailored to advantage people who are most vulnerable,
as suggested by insignificant effects of societal need factors on TANF child care
spending. Therefore, this study emphasizes the important role of states under federalism
and raises a question about devolution in providing welfare. Also, the analysis suggests
that future state policy research should take into account the role of state specific policies
in examining policy output, especially when a policy is financed through a lump-sum
money. The results show that considering states’ policy intention which is presumably
embedded in specific TANF policies helps understand state allocations of the TANF
block grants, thereby emphasizing the importance of taking into account what rules or
policies governments implement to push citizens in particular directions—which are
highly likely to be in line with governments’ policy goals. At the same time, however,
this study highlights that such state policies can result in opposite policy output
depending on states’ political environments.
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Although this study provides a possible explanation as to why there might be
substitution between state TANF job-search rule and female state legislators on having an
effect on state TANF child care provisions, further investigation is warranted to uncover
why the interaction between these two factors brings about opposite results in terms of
TANF child care spending when women make up a relatively high versus low proportion
of state legislators. Lastly, future research that investigates how different TANF policy
choices impact states’ prioritization of TANF block grant and what impacts they have on
recipients’ well-being would broaden our understanding of TANF programs. Also, it
could provide important implications for policy makers, especially when they deal with
designing a policy with highly interrelated components in a single welfare program—
such as employment and child care.
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CHAPTER 3
MAKING SENSE OF DIFFERENT WELFARE POLICY MEASURES:
HOW AND WHY DO THEY MATTER?
3.1 Introduction
What explains variation in welfare policy across American states? Since V.O.
Key’s (1949) seminal work, this question has been an essential part of the state welfare
politics literature. Scholars have produced a tremendous amount of research while
making theoretical and methodological refinements to earlier studies. Initially debating
which one of two sets of factors—i.e., political vs. economic factors—is more important
as determinants of state welfare policy, the literature has put much effort into finding new
independent variables or interactions of two variables to better explain variation across
states. Scholars also have questioned existing measures of political factors such as party
control or inter-party competition (e.g., Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993; Smith, 1997) and
come up with new measures for these variables.
Despite these advances, there has been little attention to the dependent variable;
that is, how different scholars define and operationalize state welfare policy. Studies have
used a variety of welfare policy measures to examine factors affecting welfare policy in
states, such as welfare spending per capita, the recipient rate for welfare programs, and
cash benefit levels. Each study has implicitly defined welfare in different ways by
including different components in welfare spending measures. However, the literature as
a whole has not discussed how studies define and measure welfare policy differently and
whether that matters for the findings. Does the selection of indicators of welfare policy
commitment make any difference for the findings in studies of the determinants of state
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welfare policy? If so, what difference does it make? These questions get at the issue of
whether we can generalize about welfare policy based on findings with respect to specific
measures. These are the central questions I address in this paper.
To answer the above questions, I start by explaining how previous studies
operationalized welfare policy in the American context and discuss how we might
conceptualize welfare. Getting into an empirical section, I focus on welfare policy
commitment and examine three state welfare commitment measures operationalized in
different ways based on different conceptualization of welfare. The fixed effects
estimation of 49 states covering the period after welfare reform shows that different
factors are revealed to have influence on state welfare commitment as we use different
measures of commitment. Emphasizing the importance involved in choosing a measure
for a dependent variable, this study provides better grounding for future studies that
examine related questions.

3.2 Studies of State Welfare Policy: Different Measures and Inconsistent Findings
As noted above, the aim of this study is to investigate consequences of using
different welfare policy measures as a dependent variable. Therefore, in this section, I
briefly show the kinds of state welfare policy measures scholars have examined in the
literature and discuss whether they find consistent or inconsistent results in relation to
key independent variables they examine depending on various dependent variable
measures they use.
By and large, state welfare policy determinant studies can be grouped roughly
into two categories depending on what measures of state welfare policy a study employs
as a dependent variable (see Figure 3.1). One group of studies focuses on welfare
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Figure 3.1 Classification of state welfare policy determinant studies
commitment, and the other group examines welfare generosity. Welfare commitment
refers to the degree to which a state is willing to devote its financial resources to public
welfare purposes, whereas welfare generosity indicates how well a state treats individuals
or families who are recipients or potential recipients of welfare benefits. These two
categories can be further distinguished within themselves in terms of what is included in
welfare expenditure data and how they measure it. First, studies examining state welfare
commitment use 1) state total welfare expenditures, 2) expenditures on multiple welfare
programs, or 3) expenditures on a single welfare program. Second, state welfare
generosity studies examine 1) welfare benefit levels, 2) recipient rate or number of
recipients, or 3) welfare program rules (e.g., program eligibility). Unlike the studies on
welfare commitment, these studies do not use an aggregate measure of welfare generosity
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across multiple welfare programs but focus on one particular welfare program at a time. 15
Some studies under these generosity categories examine one of these measures; others
compare results from multiple generosity measures. In addition to these, a few studies
address both welfare policy commitment and generosity in a single paper.
The question that follows is whether these scholars obtain consistent findings
across studies using different state welfare policy measures as to what factors are
important in explaining state welfare policy. Earlier studies published in the 1960s and
1970s focus on whether political or socio-economic factors better explain state welfare
policy. They pay attention to political factors such as inter-party competition and party
control and compare the effect of these to that of economic factors (Dawson & Robinson,
1963; Fry & Winters, 1970; Hofferbert, 1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969; Winters,
1976). Overall, their findings are inconsistent; some show that socio-economic factors
explain state welfare policy better than political factors (Dawson & Robinson, 1963;
Hofferbert, 1966), while others find that political variables are more important than
socio-economic variables (Fry & Winters, 1970). Also, some studies conclude that
political and socio-economic variables are both important predictors of state welfare
policy (Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969), which is the conclusion more recent studies also
make (Hwang & Gray, 1991). As there exists a wide range of differences in the way each
study is conducted (i.e., independent variables, time period examined, methodology), it is
difficult to attribute these contradictory findings to any one aspect of study designs.
However, it is apparent that dependent variables examined in these studies also vary in
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An exception to this is Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999), which combine Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefit levels and Food Stamp payment levels, to test whether states compete over
welfare benefits in a race to the bottom with their neighboring states.
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terms of types of welfare policy measures (i.e., commitment vs. generosity), and
components of the measures.
Since the late 1970s, scholars have made efforts to refine theories of political
influences, and they examined not only independent effects of political variables but also
their conditional and mediating effects (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Brown,
1995; Dye, 1984; Jennings, 1979; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997).
Given the wide range of differences in study design and measures of central political
variables (i.e., inter-party competition and party control), these studies find fairly
consistent results; political variables they examine have a conditional or a mediating
effect on state welfare policy. However, again, since the dependent variables they use are
so diverse, conducting an analysis using exactly the same research design but differing
only in state welfare policy measures might lead to a different conclusion with regard to
the impact of these political variables.
In addition to inter-party competition and partisan control of government, many
scholars have examined citizen ideology as another factor influencing welfare policy, but
it has been employed as a control variable rather than a main independent variable of
interest in a majority of studies (Berry, Fording, & Hanson, 2003; Krueger & Mueller,
2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). Findings from these studies are mixed; they find
null effect or show evidence for partial support. However, whether scholars use welfare
commitment measures or generosity measures does not make a discernible difference in
these findings. Interestingly, among studies that examined state welfare expenditures per
capita as a dependent variable, no study finds a significant independent effect of citizen
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ideology regardless of the type of citizen ideology measure employed (Krueger &
Mueller, 2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013).
Also, scholars have examined racial factors since Wright’s (1977) work on the
role of race in state welfare policy making. A group of scholars examine a backlash effect
of race, especially that of African-American population, and explore under what
condition the effect is mediated (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Fellowes &
Rowe, 2004; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Soss, Scharm, Vartania, & O’Briebn, 2001;
Wright, 1977). Race is incorporated into studies using three different kinds of race
variables: black population size, percentage black caseload, and racial bias in turnout.
While a majority of studies find a backlash effect (Wright, 1977; Brown, 1995; Fellowes
& Rowe, 2004), some show that the significance of a backlash effect depends on the state
welfare policy measures examined (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Matsubayashi &
Rocha, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003) shows that the direction
of the effect of percentage African-American is opposite when it is tested against two
different state welfare policies, one for the deserving poor and the other for the
undeserving poor. Also, Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012) find inconsistent results for
welfare commitment and generosity measures. Altogether, the previous findings suggest
that empirical findings regarding the effect of race might differ depending on which
welfare policy measure a researcher examines as a dependent variable.
The review so far highlights that there are inconsistent findings with respect to the
impact of various independent variables across studies. As I already mentioned, this may
or may not be due to employing different measures as a dependent variable. However, a
few scholars suggest that examining different measures of state welfare commitment and
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generosity could make differences in their empirical findings with regard to the
significance of a variable under investigation (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Cnudde & McCrone,
1969; Howard, 1999; Jennings, 1979; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). Therefore, it is
worth testing the thesis empirically. An empirical test conducted in this paper only
focuses on commitment measures of welfare policy. If results indeed change when one
uses different dependent variable measures of state welfare policy to reflect differences in
state welfare commitment, we have an opportunity to further examine how and why they
differ across models. This can lead to refinements in theories of welfare policy. The
following section describes how I construct different measures of state welfare policy
commitment that are empirically tested in this paper.

3.3 Conceptualizing Welfare Policy in the U.S.
While many scholars have been eager to find explanations for variation in the
level of welfare efforts and welfare spending across states (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Fry &
Winters, 1970; Jennings, 1979; Plotnick & Winters, 1985), few studies provide
explanations of what welfare means and how authors define the term at the outset. Some
cross-national studies provide an operational definition of welfare or welfare state, but
many apply the definition that comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) or the International Labour Organization (ILO) without
explaining the choice of that definition. This is the case in studies of the American states
as well. Most state-level research refers to a classification of state government finance
published by the Census Bureau and do not provide proper explanation of why the
categories the Census Bureau consider to be welfare constitute welfare: Researchers use
those categories as welfare because the government documents classify them as welfare
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expenditures. Lack of discussion on this core concept becomes more problematic when
scholars do not agree on the contents of the conception of welfare. For example, scholars
interested in differences in welfare spending across the states might be looking at
different welfare programs as a group, although these welfare programs as a group can be
different in meaningful ways. Without a consensus among scholars about the definition
of welfare, empirical studies conducted to explain allegedly the same phenomenon are
not investigating the same thing after all. Therefore, the absence of discussion of the core
concept can be a serious flaw for the literature as a whole.
Richard Titmuss, in his seminal essay on the Social Division of Welfare, seems to
be one of the first scholars who opened the door for scholarly discussion on the concept
of the welfare state. Titmuss (1958) believes that the welfare state provides guaranteed
minimum standards of living through social services in response to changing needs of a
society. According to him, those needs occur because individuals are situated in ‘states of
dependency’ for a variety of reasons over the course of their lives (Titmuss, 1958, quote
from the original author). He and his successors represent the European view of the
welfare state, which emphasizes redistribution of income as one of the important
objectives of the welfare state. Also, Titmuss’s tradition makes it clear that social
services provided by the welfare state are considered rights that a citizen could claim
(Atherton, 1989). Reviewing studies of the past twenty-five years after the term “the
welfare state” was first used in 1941, Schottland (1967) comes to the conclusion that
scholars of both the U.S. and Western Europe generally agree that the welfare state exerts
power to effect a redistribution of income by intervening in the play of market and
political forces. This interpretation, which seems to be heavily based on English historian
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Asa Briggs’ (1961) definition of the welfare state (Schottland, 1967), further notes that
promoting economic security through income maintenance programs has been the
primary goal of welfare states.
Briggs provides more precise criteria for identifying the welfare state by stating
that the welfare state is “a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least
three directions” (Briggs, 1961, p. 228). These include guaranteeing a minimum income,
protecting against income insecurity and vulnerability by helping people to deal with
social risks, and providing all citizens with the best standards of limited social services.
Meanwhile, for some, his definition is viewed as describing an ideal type of welfare state
indicating what the welfare state should be (Goodin, 1982; Wedderburn, 1965). For
example, Wedderburn (1965) points out that the third component—the best standards of
service provision for all—of the welfare state in Briggs’ definition is not accepted widely,
and people rather agree that the welfare state “modifies the play of market forces in order
to ensure a minimum real income for all” to some degree (Wedderburn, 1965, p. 127-8).
The influence of Briggs (1961) is also found in Esping-Andersen (1983, 1990), who is
famously known for his typology of welfare regimes. In The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism (1990), Esping-Andersen does not provide a clear answer to what he stressed
as an important, yet neglected question in the welfare state literature--that is, “when,
indeed, is a state a welfare state?” (p. 18). Instead, he introduces a common textbook
definition which states that the welfare state “involves state responsibility for securing
some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 18-19).
However, his emphasis on the concept of “de-commodification” in developing the
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typology of the three welfare regimes tells us what he considers important in understanding
the welfare state concept. According to Esping-Andersen, de-commodification is a
“mainspring” of modern social policy (p. 35), which enables people “to maintain a
livelihood without reliance on the market” (p. 22) through provision of social services as
a matter of right. In fact, this idea of de-commodification is presented in his earlier work
where he defines the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1983) clearly stated that “the state
is a welfare state when it guarantees a decent standard of living to all, as a citizen’s right”
(p. 28), and guaranteeing basic economic security for all citizens is one of the most
important principles of the welfare state. Similar to Titmuss (1958) and Briggs (1961), he
views welfare benefits as a matter of right to all citizens.
While these European scholars have stressed redistribution of income as an
important objective of the welfare state more than American scholars (Atherton, 1989),
what seems central in the discussion among American scholars, past and present, is that
assuring economic security of people against social and economic risks is a central goal
of the American welfare state. It must be reemphasized that I do not insist that
redistribution is a totally neglected dimension of the American welfare state. Rather, I
argue that the most important criterion by which we should judge what welfare is in the
current American context is whether welfare programs attempt to ensure economic
security and economic well-being of the people. The emergence and development of the
welfare state in U.S. history show America has put more emphasis on protecting the
people—mostly the weak—from economic insecurity stemming from unregulated market
forces through welfare arrangements rather than alleviating inequality. Public assistance
was first introduced in the form of public relief, and the U.S. made the first step into the
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modern welfare state in the 1910s with the passage of mother’s pension laws to provide
regular payments to needy widowed mothers (Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, &
Lehmann, 1993). Moreover, providing economic security is mentioned as a central goal
of today’s American welfare state in recent scholarly works (Garfinkel & Smeeding,
2010; Katz, 2010a; 2010b).
Katz (2010a, 2010b) is one of the few American scholars who offer a systematic
definition of welfare. He defines welfare and the welfare state as “a collection of
programs designed to assure economic security to all citizens by guaranteeing the
fundamental necessities of life: food, shelter, medical care, protection in childhood and
old age” (Katz, 2010b, p. 510). To him, protecting people from risk is fundamental to the
welfare state. Similar to Katz (2010a, 2010b), Garfinkel and Smeeding (2010) emphasize
that the welfare state designs institutions that reduce economic insecurity that stems from
capitalism. Based on this discussion, I cast a broader net to define welfare, which is more
comprehensive than that to which the public and politicians usually refer. While a
minimalist definition of welfare includes only those programs targeted at the poor and
often used in a pejorative sense, I define the American welfare state as a set of
government programs that ensure economic security of people. “Is Program X designed
to protect people from economic insecurity?” This is the very first question we can ask in
sorting out welfare programs from other governmental programs.

3.4 Hypothesis
Paying attention to dependent variables and their measures is important as how
studies define a core concept and operationalize measures of a dependent variable show
what focal phenomenon scholars would like to explain and understand, not to mention
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whether they are investigating the same phenomenon. From an empirical standpoint, lack
of discussion of the conception of the dependent variable—in this case, state welfare
commitment—becomes more problematic when we have inconsistent findings as to what
explains variation in welfare commitment across states. As shown earlier, scholars define
state welfare commitment in a variety of ways. Moreover, they report inconsistent
findings across studies. Inconsistent findings on the effect of various key factors provide
motivation to empirically test whether the choice of a dependent variable measure really
matters. What might be the consequences of examining different welfare commitment
measures with regard to finding determinants of state welfare policy?
Presumably, using different conceptualizations and measures of welfare
commitment is likely to produce different results in terms of what factors matter and how
because different measures reflect different phenomena and these phenomena would
result from different dynamics among various political, socio-economic, and
demographic factors. In this study, therefore, I test a general hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis: The choice of a state welfare commitment measure as a dependent
variable results in differences in empirical results as to what factors explain
variation in welfare commitment across states.
While keeping an eye on other factors, this study pays particular attention to
political factors. Support for welfare in general has been viewed as an outcome of
political struggles between different political parties and citizens that have different
stakes in welfare. However, depending on how we define welfare commitment and which
welfare commitment measure we examine, associated politics of state welfare policy
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might not be identical. Details on a set of different measures of state welfare commitment
are discussed in the following section.

3.5 Methods
3.5.1 Models
I empirically test the hypothesis using three models including a different measure
of state welfare commitment as a dependent variable. It is difficult to attribute
contradictory findings from the literature to any one aspect of studies, due to a wide range
of differences in research design, variables included, and time period covered. Therefore,
the key to estimating the three models is to model them as having an identical set of
independent variables. The specific form of these models is as follows:
Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 + ΣμsDs + ΣρtDt + εs,t ,
where Ys,t is a dependent variable, state welfare commitment variable for a given
state s at a given year t. Xs,t-1 is a vector of political, economic, programmatic, and
demographic factors of state s at year t-1. Ds represents a state dummy variable, Dt
indicates a year dummy variable, and ε s,t is a random error term.
I estimate the above fixed effects regression model including state and year
dummies three times with different dependent variables—i.e., a measure of state welfare
commitment—and the same set of independent variables and obtain the Least Square
Dummy Variable estimators. By including dummy variables for each state, I control for
unobserved time-invariant characteristics within the states which may impact the
independent and the dependent variables. The year dummies remove the impact of certain
events that influence state welfare spending across the board in the states. I compare the
estimators obtained from each of the three models to see whether the impact of various
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factors on state welfare commitment changes as we examine different measures of
welfare commitment.
I originally set up the models as a dynamic panel model which contains a oneyear lag of the dependent variable as an independent variable with state and year fixed
effects, and estimate them using the Arellano-Bond (1991) generalized method-ofmoments estimator. The Arellano-Bond estimator addresses the problem of
autocorrelation between the lagged variable and the residuals by allowing lagged values
of the dependent variable to be included in the model as an additional independent
variable. However, the three dependent variables in each model are so highly correlated
individually over time that the Arellano-Bond estimators fail the test of instrument
variables being uncorrelated with error terms. Therefore, I estimate fixed effects
regression models without lagged dependent variables. In the Appendix B, I discuss how
and why the estimators do not work by showing the results of post-estimation diagnostic
tests for the Arellano-Bond estimation.
The data cover all states except for Nebraska. Because Nebraska has a nonpartisan state legislature, the data on some political variables are not available for the
state. The studied period is FY 1999 to FY 2010. I choose FY 1999 as the beginning year
of the analysis because not all the provisions and amendments in PRWORA became
immediately effective when the law was adopted in August, 1996. For example, the
PRWORA required states to implement Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) by July 1, 1997, allowing about a year for states to plan and adjust their policies
(Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 1996).
Therefore, I deem more appropriate to assume that there was some delay in timing for the
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welfare reform to have influence on state welfare policies. Since state welfare
commitment data are fiscal year data, I use a one-year lag for all of the independent
variables that use calendar year data. Policy decisions are usually made during earlier
months of a calendar year, so it makes sense to match data in this way. It is not unlikely
that Federal aid variables that use fiscal year data have a contemporaneous effect on state
welfare commitment, but due to endogeneity concerns, I lag these variables by one year. I
adjust all dollar terms using the state Consumer Price Index developed by Carrillo, Early,
and Olsen (2014).
3.5.2 Dependent Variables: State Welfare Commitment Measures
State welfare commitment refers to the degree to which a state is willing to devote
its financial resources for public welfare purposes, which is measured as the log of per
capita state welfare expenditures. 16 In this paper, I exploit three measures of state welfare
commitment based on different conceptualizations of welfare to test whether choosing
one measure over the others make any difference in the estimation results. First, I use the
U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of welfare spending that determines the Census measure.
While the Census Bureau does not provide a definition of welfare per se, we can infer it
by looking at what categories of spending are reported under a relevant category in the
Census’s State Government Finance database. Many previous studies refer to a
classification of state government finance document published by the Census Bureau and
analyze data that are reported under the ‘Public Welfare’ category in the Census database

Previous studies use either state welfare expenditures or state and local welfare expenditures as a
dependent variable to examine determinants of state welfare commitment (e.g., Gilligan & Matsusaka,
1995; Hill & Leighly, 1992; Jennings, 1979; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013). It seems that
there is no consensus as to whether we should combine welfare expenditures spent by localities into a
measure of state welfare commitment to examine determinants of state welfare commitment. In this paper, I
use direct welfare expenditures from states only.
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(U.S. Census, 2006). 17 Under the Census classification, state welfare expenditures consist
of expenditures associated with Supplemental Security Income (SSI), TANF, Medicaid,
other cash assistance programs that give cash directly to individuals contingent upon their
need, payments to private vendors providing welfare services including medical care,
provision, construction, and maintenance of welfare institutions, and other welfare
activities not classified elsewhere, such as children services (U.S. Census, 2006). By
looking at what the Census database includes as public welfare, it is quite clear that what
the Census Bureau categorizes as public welfare programs are those targeted at the poor
and often used in a pejorative sense, although SSI and Medicaid may be viewed
somewhat differently. Therefore, I first estimate Model 1 which employs a measure of
state welfare expenditures as shown in the Census public welfare category (Census
measure).
Second, I construct a more comprehensive measure of state welfare commitment
based on a broader concept of welfare state (Comprehensive measure 1). As suggested
earlier, I conceptualize the American welfare state as a set of government programs that
ensure economic security of people. By definition, this conception of welfare
incorporates various aspects of social policy, including Unemployment Insurance,
Workers’ Compensation, and public education, which is more comprehensive than the
Census Bureau’s implied definition of welfare. Therefore, to construct the second
measure of state welfare commitment reflecting this broader concept, I cast a broader net
to add a series of spending data to the Census welfare expenditure data. Most
importantly, the Census database does not include expenditures on Unemployment
17

These studies include Hwang and Gray (1991), Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), Krueger and Muller
(2001), Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012), and Radcliff and Saiz (1995).

51

Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, and public education under the public welfare
category. While Unemployment Insurance provides economic assistance to unemployed
workers who lost their jobs through no fault of their own, such as layoffs or
retrenchment, Workers’ Compensation provides wage replacement and medical benefits
to employees injured while in their work. Not only are both programs part of the upper
tier of the American welfare state (Howard 1999), but they also meet the comprehensive
definition of welfare discussed above.
Unlike these two welfare policies having been recognized as a part of the policy
package of the welfare state, public education has largely been dismissed and viewed as
different by many welfare state scholars (e.g., Wilensky, 1975). At the same time,
however, some scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1990) acknowledge that education is
one of the salient parts of the welfare state, and more and more studies have scrutinized
public education in relation to other social policies (Hega & Hokenmaier, 2002; Iversen
& Stephens, 2008; Nikolai, 2011). Also, there are scholars who explicitly state that public
education should be seen as a part of American welfare state. Public education served as
an Ersatz welfare state in the U.S. (Heidenheimer, 1981) and must be viewed as “a
central component of the American notion of welfare,” according to Janowitz (1976, p.
34-5). More recently, public education has been recognized as a part of the American
welfare state by scholars who emphasize the provision of economic security as central in
understanding the American welfare state (Garfinkel & Smeeding, 2010; Katz, 2010a;
2010b). Education policy is different from other welfare policies in that provision of
education indirectly reduces economic insecurity by helping people raise their capability
to deal with economically difficult situations (Garfinkel & Smeeding, 2010); it provides
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social protection through social investment. Also, public education is available to all
citizens; there is no restriction as to who can benefit, unlike other welfare programs.
Following this recent scholarship, thus, considering public education as a welfare program
is appropriate. I separate out expenditures on these programs that are placed under
different Census functional categories and combine them with the first measure—i.e., the
Census measure— to create the second measure—i.e., Comprehensive measure 1—and
estimate Model 2.
Lastly, I use a state welfare commitment measure subtracting public education
spending from the Comprehensive measure 1 in Model 3—i.e., Comprehensive measure
2. Although I argue that public education can be considered a part of welfare, some might
still be reluctant to combine public education with other traditional public assistance and
social security in examining state welfare commitment. It is different from other welfare
programs I list above in that education focuses on equality of opportunity rather than
equality of condition (Castles, 1989, p. 431), and it is universally available to all who
want to use it. Also, it is future-oriented in that it benefits people in their future by
strengthening their ability to cope with economic difficulties that they will face in the
future. Table 3.1 provides information on the measure of state welfare policy
commitment used in each model.
3.5.3 Independent Variables
POLITICAL FACTORS. Scholars have paid attention to political forces that
might influence state commitment to welfare. Sparked by the V. O. Key’s (1949) seminal
work on Southern politics, earlier studies in the literature question whether political or
economic factors better explain variation in state welfare policy (Cnudde & McCrone,
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1969; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Fry & Winters, 1970; Hofferbert, 1966; Sharkansky &
Hofferbert, 1969). These studies focus on inter-party competition, party control, and
political variables as a group and compare the impact of those relative to that of socioeconomic variables. In the current study, I examine (1) Unified Democrat Control, (2)
Unified Republican Control, (3) Inter-Party Competition, (4) Electoral Competition, (5)
Government Liberalism, and (6) Citizen Liberalism as political factors in the baseline
model.
Table 3.1 Measures and Measurements of State Welfare Commitment in Three Models
Model

Measure

Model 1

Census measure

Model 2

Comprehensive measure 1

Model 3

Comprehensive measure 2

Measurement
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures,
reported under a public welfare category in the
Census database. They include state expenditures
associated with Supplemental Security Income,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
Medicaid, other cash assistance programs that give
cash directly to individuals contingent upon their
need, payments to private vendors providing welfare
services including medical care, provision,
construction, and maintenance of welfare
institutions, and other welfare activities not
classified elsewhere such as children services.
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures,
reported under a public welfare category in the
Census database plus state spending on
Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation,
and public education (elementary and secondary).
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures,
reported under a public welfare category in the
Census database plus state spending on
Unemployment Insurance and Workers’
Compensation.

Note: Differences across measures compared to the Census measure are highlighted in italics.

(1) Unified Democrat Control. This variable indicates whether all branches of a
state government are controlled by Democrats. If Democrats control both state
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legislatures and governorship, the variable takes a value of one, and otherwise zero.
While previous studies find mixed results on the effect of Democratic control on state
welfare commitment, there is evidence that Democrats are more likely to support welfare
than Republicans (Hwang & Gray, 1991) and that unified Republican control leads to
lower state spending on welfare (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995).
(2) Unified Republican Control. This indicates whether both state legislatures and
governorship are controlled by Republicans. If Republicans control all branches of a state
government, the variable takes a value of one, and otherwise zero. Including a separate
dummy variable for full Republican control makes it easier to interpret the results.
Scholars have employed different ways of measuring partisan control. For
example, Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012) separate party control measures for
governorship and legislatures. This way of measuring partisan control would be suitable
if a researcher is more interested in the effect of governor and legislators separately.
However, since both executive and legislative branches need to endorse a bill to realize a
policy, it is more appropriate to combine both branches in a single measure if one would
like to test whether either party controlling a state government matters. Meanwhile, other
scholars examine legislative partisan composition (or party strength) from Smith (1997)
instead of or together with partisan control, either using a number (Gilligan & Matsusaka,
1995) or a percentage of seats held by Democrats in state legislatures (Barrilleaux et al.,
2002; Krueger & Muller, 2001). These studies ignore the power that governors might
exert in policy processes. A party strength measure assumes linearity in changes, so even
though these studies hypothetically take into account governors’ power by adding a
governorship variable as an additional control, for example, an interpretation of it is less
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relevant to what this study tries to explain than the categorical measure this study
employs. Since there is empirical evidence that Democrats behave differently from
Republicans as a group in supporting welfare (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Hwang &
Gray, 1991), this study is interested in whether the difference is observed, if any, as a
function of discrete change in party control when we apply different measures of welfare
commitment. Whether Democrats or Republicans holding seats by one more percent or
one more seat in the legislatures makes a difference in terms of welfare policy is of less
interest in this study.
(3) Inter-Party Competition. This variable measures the degree of party control
of, and competition between two parties for control of, a state government (Hill, 2003).
This study uses the “folded” Ranney (1976) index that utilizes the partisan composition
of state legislatures, the vote share for the parties’ gubernatorial candidates, and the
percentage of time that the parties held both the governorship and a majority in the state
legislature. The index ranges from 0.5 to 1, 0.5 denoting one party dominance and 1
indicating perfect competition between the two parties. Using this measure (unfolded
version), Cnudde and McCrone (1969) shows that the effect of inter-party competition on
change in spending of several welfare policies varies depending on what policy one
examines, while Flavin (2015) does not find that inter-party competition is an important
factor in explaining the share of state welfare spending in total state expenditures.
Meanwhile, using a measure very similar to Ranney’s classification, Dye (1984) finds
that competition within states does not ensure increases in state welfare expenditures
under Democratic control. Utilizing only the data on the percentage of seats held by
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Democrats, Preuhs (2007) shows that her measure of political competition does not
explain different indicators of the welfare state.
(4) Electoral Competition. This variable measures the degree of competitiveness
of district-level state legislative elections. This study employs Holbrook and Van Dunk’s
(1993) measure that uses information on vote for winners, the margin of victory,
uncontested seats, and safe seats. Scholars have often used the Ranney index and
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure interchangeably to measure inter-party competition
partly because they highly and positively correlate to each other for some period of time
in the past (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). However, the two measures are conceptually very
different (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012) and do not have a
positive correlation any more (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). While Ranney’s measure also
uses election results (but only that of gubernatorial elections), it focuses more on the
extent to which parties compete for control of state government. On the contrary,
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure of electoral competition gives more weight to the
extent to which the parties are competitive in individual state legislative elections. Using
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure, Barrilleaux et al. (2002) finds that the effect of electoral
competition depends on party control of the legislature, and Soss et al. (2001) shows that
a state with more competitive elections is likely to have more generous TANF policy.
Interestingly, these two groups of studies using a different measure of party
competition both are inspired by V. O. Key's central thesis regarding inter-party
competition (Key, 1949), but use theoretically different concepts of party competition. I
view that electoral competition is closer to what V. O. Key (1949) tries to say when he
argues that inter-party competition leads policy to be more oriented to the “have-nots” in
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society because competition serves as a mechanism that enables the have-nots to promote
their preferences as parties compete for votes. However, as studies examining state
welfare politics employ either the Ranney index or Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure
and empirical results are not consistent even within each group of studies, I test whether
they both have impact on each of the dependent variables by including these two together
in a single equation. Because these two measures of party competition are both
theoretically and empirically different, including both in the same model does not cause a
problem (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012).
(5) Government Liberalism. This variable indicates the relative liberalism of a
state government, i.e., how close to the left state legislators and governors stand on the
ideological continuum. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and
Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government ideology, which ranges from
0 to 100, with larger numbers reflecting a more liberal government ideology. While the
findings are mixed, there is empirical evidence that states with more liberal governments
spend more money on welfare and have less restrictive benefit eligibility rules (Berry,
Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Rom, 1999; Soss et al., 2001).
(6) Citizen Liberalism. This variable measures the relative liberalism of citizens in
each state. The data for this variable comes from an updated version of Berry et al.’s
(1998) study of the measure of citizen and government ideology in the American states,
which covers the period 1960-2013. It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger numbers
reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. While some studies show no statistically
significant effect of citizen liberalism on total state welfare commitment (Krueger &
Muller, 2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013), others find that a state with
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more liberal citizens tends to adopt more generous welfare policy (Barrilleaux & Bernick,
2003; Ringquist et al., 1997; Reingold & Smith, 2012).
ECONOMIC FACTORS. Economic factors are widely examined determinants of
state welfare expenditure levels. Some earlier studies conclude that the effect of interparty competition is spurious and in fact economic forces are more important than
political forces (Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Hofferbert, 1966). However, other studies
have shown that economic factors are not substitutes but complements to political factors
(Hwang & Gray, 1991; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969). Therefore, this study examines
(1) Income and (2) Unemployment as economic indicators.
(1) Income. This variable indicates fiscal capacity of a state, measured as log of
per capita state personal income. While previous studies show somewhat mixed findings,
many studies find that states with greater fiscal capacity have higher state welfare
spending. (Hill & Leighly, 1992; Hwang & Gray, 1991; Krueger & Muller, 2002;
Radcliff & Saiz, 1995).
(2) Unemployment. As a popular measure denoting an economic condition of a
state, this variable is measured as the percentage of state labor force who are unemployed.
Since this variable shows how well a state is doing economically, thereby indicating
demands for welfare, it is expected that a higher unemployment rate leads to higher
welfare spending in a state (Flavin, 2015).
PROGRAMMATIC FACTOR. Third, this study includes a programmatic factor
that is found to affect state welfare commitment, which is Federal Aid.
Federal Aid. This variable is measured as log of per capita total federal aid
transferred to a state. Some welfare programs such as Medicaid and Child Care
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Development Block Grant Program require states to match federal funds. Therefore, there
would be effects of matching federal grants, which will positively influence state total
welfare commitment as the amount of federal aid increases (Barrilleaux et al., 2002;
Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012).
DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS. Lastly, this study estimates the effects of various
demographic factors: (1) African-American, (2) Hispanic, (3) Poverty, and (4) Elderly.
These variables account for demands for welfare and different attitudes toward welfare.
(1) African-American. This variable measures the proportion of state population
that is African-American. Many studies hypothesize that there is a backlash effect when
black population constitutes a large proportion of the society and find evidence of racism
as an explanation for state welfare policy choices, including welfare spending levels
(Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Matsubayashi &
Rocha, 2012; Soss et al., 2001; Wright, 1977).
(2) Hispanic. Similar to the above variable, this variable indicates to what extent
a state consists of the Hispanic population. It is measured as the percentage of state
population that is Hispanic. Some studies find that a state with larger Hispanic
populations is likely to spend less on welfare (Flavin, 2015; Matsubayashi & Rocha,
2012). Together with African-American variable, this variable can show whether there is
a racial effect on state welfare commitment.
(3) Poverty. This variable shows the percentage of state population living below
the federal poverty level. Welfare programs incur costs when there are a greater number
of poor people as the poor are the main recipients of welfare benefits and services.
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Reflecting demands for welfare, this variable is expected to have a positive relationship
with state welfare commitment.
(4) Elderly. This variable measures the percentage of state population who are 65
years old and above. The proportion of the elderly is often studied in Medicaid or other
health policies. However, given that senior citizens are politically more active in
participating in elections and that they support more spending on welfare (Howard, 2007),
the percentage of this population could have an impact on welfare spending of a state.
Table 3.2 below shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in the models.
Details on the dependent and independent variable measures and sources of the data are
summarized in Table B.2 in the Appendix B.
Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for FY 1999-FY 2010
Variable
State Welfare Commitment 1
(Model 1)
State Welfare Commitment 2
(Model 2)
State Welfare Commitment 3
(Model 3)
Unified Democrat Control
Unified Republican Control
Inter-Party Competition
Electoral Competition
Government Liberalism
Citizen Liberalism
Income
Unemployment
Federal Aid 1 (Model 1)
Federal Aid 2 (Model 2)
Federal Aid 3 (Model 3)
Elderly
African-American
Hispanic
Poverty

Unit

Obs

Mean

S.D

Min

Max

Log, $

588

7.03

0.31

5.76

7.80

Log, $

588

7.21

0.34

6.02

8.17

Log, $

588

7.18

0.31

6.00

8.00

0/1
0/1
0.5-1
0-100
0-100
0-100
Log, $
%
Log, $
Log, $
Log, $
%
%
%
%

588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588

0.27
0.26
0.88
38.71
47.83
52.58
10.54
5.06
6.61
6.91
6.63
12.65
10.50
8.88
11.91

0.45
0.44
0.09
11.05
13.70
15.63
0.16
1.61
0.34
0.29
0.33
1.80
9.60
9.39
3.14

0
0
0.64
12.05
17.56
8.45
10.21
2.3
5.63
6.02
5.72
5.27
0.31
0.54
4.5

1
1
1.00
63.10
73.62
95.97
11.04
13.7
7.46
7.65
7.47
18.03
37.08
46.03
23.1

Note: The statistics are for 49 states excluding Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year.
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3.6 Results
Table 3.3 gives the empirical results from the regression analysis using the panel
data covering 49 states over FY 1999-FY 2010 with year and state fixed effects. Each
model employs a different dependent variable measure, but the included independent
variables are exactly the same across the three models. At first glance, it is apparent that
the statistical significance and the magnitude of a few coefficients are not similar across
the three models, especially when Model 1 with the conventional measure of state
welfare commitment is compared with the other two models using the comprehensive
measures. While Federal Aid is strongly associated with state welfare commitment across
all three models (p<0.01), the results from Unified Democrat Control, Inter-Party
Competition, Government Liberalism, Income, Unemployment, and Hispanic variables
are different depending on the measure of welfare commitment employed. Among
political variables, the effect of Unified Democrat Control becomes statistically different
from zero (p<0.10) when I depart from using the narrowly defined measure of welfare
commitment; it is significant in Model 2 and Model 3 but not in Model 1. Similarly,
Government Liberalism is significant at the 1% significance level in Model 1 but only at
the 10% level in the other two models, while Inter-Party Competition is significant at the
5% level of significance in Model 2 but only at the 10% level in Model 1 and Model 3.
Also, the difference between the magnitude of its coefficients seems to be relatively large
across the models. The coefficients of Inter-Party Competition show that as inter-party
competition in a state becomes more competitive by a 0.1 point, state welfare
commitment increases by 1.9% in Model 1, 3% in Model 2, and 2.4% in Model 3. While
none of the economic variables explain state welfare commitment when welfare is
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Table 3.3 Determinants of State Welfare Commitment from Three Models with Different
Dependent Variable Measures, FY 1999-FY 2010
Model
(DV Measure)
Independent Variables
Unified Democrat Control (0/1)
Unified Republican Control (0/1)
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1)
Electoral Competition (0-100)
Government Liberalism (0-100)
Citizen Liberalism (0-100)
Income (log, $)
Unemployment (%)
Federal Aid (log, $)
Elderly (%)
African-American (%)
Hispanic (%)
Poverty (%)
Constant
Observations
Number of states
R-squared

Model 1
(Census
Measure)

Model 2
(Comprehensive
Measure 1)

Model 3
(Comprehensive
Measure 2)

2.80
(2.33)
<0.0001
(2.71)
18.6*
(10.6)
0.13
(0.20)
0.21***
(0.07)
0.13
(0.11)
0.57
(0.41)
-0.04
(1.03)
0.34***
(0.06)
2.32
(3.47)
1.24
(3.37)
3.12*
(1.71)
0.43
(0.41)
-2.51
(4.11)
588

4.53*
(2.32)
-0.45
(2.98)
30.2**
(13.1)
-0.08
(0.21)
0.20*
(0.11)
0.10
(0.11)
0.68*
(0.38)
2.36**
(1.05)
0.34***
(0.07)
2.92
(3.04)
1.47
(3.25)
4.19**
(1.75)
0.50
(0.42)
-3.89
(3.94)
588

4.40*
(2.35)
-0.98
(2.78)
23.7*
(12.2)
-0.02
(0.21)
0.17*
(0.10)
0.12
(0.11)
0.64
(0.39)
2.60**
(1.06)
0.29***
(0.05)
2.94
(2.95)
1.59
(2.91)
4.32**
(1.73)
0.46
(0.43)
-3.09
(4.01)
588

49

49

49

0.92

0.94

0.93

Note: Entries of coefficients are fixed effect estimates from a panel data model with state and year dummy
variables. The dependent variable in each model is log of per capita state total welfare expenditures in each
fiscal year. All independent variables are lagged by one year and tested against a two-sided alternative.
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. The coefficients and standard errors of all independent variables except for those using dollar as a unit
are presented after multiplying each original regression output by 100 for ease of interpretation.
b. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature.
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narrowly defined, Income predicts welfare commitment in Model 2 (p<0.10), and
Unemployment predicts welfare commitment in Model 2 and Model 3(p<0.05). Among
demographic variables, Hispanic is associated with state welfare commitment no matter
how it is measured, but its effect is detected at the 5% significant level in Model 2 and
Model 3 (p<0.05) in comparison to the 10% significance level in Model 1. Overall, these
findings suggest that the choice of dependent variable in the analysis could change the
way we understand state welfare policy making. A study that employs the narrowest
measure of state welfare commitment—i.e., Census Measure—would conclude that
Unified Democrat Control, Income, and Unemployment do not have statistically
significant influence on state welfare commitment, whereas one using the broadest
measure—i.e., Comprehensive Measure 1—would find those variables to be important in
explaining state welfare spending. Similarly, a researcher using the welfare commitment
measure that is conventionally used would be more convinced that Government
Liberalism is a good predictor of state commitment compared to one who uses a broader
measure of welfare commitment.
The results shown in Table 3.3 is the key that highlights the consequences of
choosing one dependent variable measure over others. However, I investigate further to
see to what extent the results across the three models are substantively different using the
regression output reported in the table. This is particularly important for interpreting and
grasping the meaning of coefficients of political variables since those variables are index
variables which are not easy to interpret. Table 3.4 shows the predicted influence of
independent variables on state welfare commitment in the three models. More
specifically, I obtain predicted change in state welfare commitment when an independent
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variable increases by one standard deviation (henceforth, s.d.) from the mean. Effects of
independent variables are reported only for those whose coefficients are statistically
different from zero at the 10% significance level or less at least in one of the three
models. Since the dependent variables are entered as a logarithmic form in the models, I
calculate the predicted change using levels of state welfare spending per capita.
Table 3.4 Predicted Influence on State Welfare Commitment Across Models
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable Brought About
by Moving Independent Variable One Standard Deviation Above Mean
Model 2
Model3
Model 1
(Comprehensive
(Comprehensive
(Census Measure)
Measure 1)
Measure 2)
Unified Democrat
2.04% more
1.99% more
n/a
Control
($28 more per capita)
($26 more per capita)
Inter-Party
1.62% more
2.64% more
2.07% more
Competition
($18 more per capita)
($36 more per capita)
($27 more per capita)
Government
2.84 % more
2.76% more
2.34% more
Liberalism
($32 more per capita)
($37 more per capita)
($31 more per capita)
11.30 % more
Income
n/a
n/a
($153 more per capita)
3.87% more
4.28% more
Unemployment
n/a
($52 more per capita)
($56 more per capita)
12.14% more
10.19% more
17.95% more
Federal Aid
($137 more per capita) ($138 more per capita) ($236 more per capita)
33.97% more
48.24% more
50% more
Hispanic
($383 more per capita) ($653 more per capita) ($658 more per capita)
Note: Individual effects are only reported for variables whose coefficient is statistically significant at the
10% significance level or less at least in one model. They represent the predicted change in the dependent
variables, holding all other variables at their mean. In calculating the change, I undo log transformation of
the predicted value of dependent variables so that interpretation of the predicted change can be made
toward levels. n/a: Not applicable.

The estimates show that the effect of moving independent variable by one s.d.
above the mean is greatest when the Hispanic variable changes. Depending on the model,
states where the proportion of Hispanic is one s.d. above the mean are predicted to spend
34% to 50% more on welfare than the average states. Moving Federal Aid one s.d. from
the mean exerts the second largest influence on the change in state welfare commitment,
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predicted to increase state welfare commitment by 10.2% to 18% compared to the
average states depending on the model examined. A state with Income one s.d. above the
mean tends to spend 11.3% more on welfare than the average when the broadest measure
of welfare commitment is considered, while an increase in Unemployment by one s.d.
from the mean is related to 3.9% and 4.3% more welfare spending in Model 2 and Model
3, respectively. Compared to these variables, one s.d. increase in political variables has
weaker influence on the change in state welfare commitment. Increasing these variables
by one s.d. from the mean leads to a raise in state welfare commitment by 1.6% to 2.8%.
Despite relatively small impact of political variables on state welfare commitment, it is
important to note that they have differential effects across models. Again, it is possible
that one can reach to different conclusion as to what matters for state welfare
commitment depending on the choice of welfare commitment indicators.
As a further examination, I conduct a test on the equality of coefficients across the
models using seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962). The test results indicate
whether the coefficients of each independent variable across the models are statistically
different from each other. I test the equality jointly across the three models (i.e., F-test)
and between two models paired differently (i.e., t-test). Table 3.5 shows the p-values
resulting from the equality tests. Variables in bold indicate those that are shown as
statistically significant at the 10% level or less in at least one of the three models in Table
3.3. As shown in the second column of the table, the coefficients of five variables—i.e.,
Unified Democrat Control, Electoral Competition, Unemployment, Federal Aid, and
Hispanic—are significantly different across the three models at different level of
significance although Electoral Competition is not a statistically significant predictor in
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all three models as reported in Table 3.3. The results shown in the last three columns
suggest that the differences in the coefficients of these variables are mostly derived from
the fact that the coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2 are different and those in Model 1
and Model 3 are different. These variables exert significantly different influence on state
welfare commitment when I compare Model 1 with Model 2 or Model 1 with Model 3
(p<0.05 or p<0.01). Meanwhile, the effect of Inter-Party Competition is significantly
different between Model 1 and Model 2 (p>0.10) although it is not different when all
three models are jointly taken into account.
Table 3.5 Equality of the Coefficients of Independent Variables Across Models
Equality
Independent Variable
Unified Democrat Control
Unified Republican Control
Inter-Party Competition
Electoral Competition
Government Liberalism
Citizen Liberalism
Income
Unemployment
Federal Aid
Elderly
African-American
Hispanic
Poverty

M1=M2=M3

M1 = M2

M1 = M3

M2 = M3

0.06
0.50
0.13
0.01**

0.03**
0.30
0.08*
<0.01***

0.02**
0.24
0.26

0.75
0.95
0.10*

0.37
0.52
0.65
<0.0001***
<0.0001***
0.87
0.28
<0.01***
0.97

0.26
0.40
0.47
<0.0001***
0.01***
0.65
0.97
0.01**
0.81

<0.01***
0.17
0.67
0.37
<0.0001***
<0.0001***
0.60
0.51
<0.001***
0.81

0.50
0.78
0.29
0.83
0.14
0.03*
0.95
0.14
0.17
0.97

Note: M1, M2, and M3 indicate each model that uses a different dependent variable measure. Model 1
employs the Census measure of welfare commitment, and Model 2 uses Comprehensive measure 1 which
adds to the Census measure state spending on Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, and
public education. The dependent variable measure used in Model 3 is Comprehensive measure 2 which is
Comprehensive measure 1 net of commitment on public education. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. Independent variables in bold indicate those whose coefficient is statistically significant at the 10%
significance level or less at least in one model.
b. P-values are rounded to the second decimal.

Comparing the results from Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5 reveals that we
would have gained different understanding especially of the role four variables—i.e.,
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Unified Democrat Control, Unemployment, Federal Aid, and Hispanic— play in
explaining state welfare commitment depending on the choice of policy output measures.
They differ not only in terms of to what extent they are a statistically significant predictor
but also in terms of the magnitude of their marginal effects. For example, a researcher
who uses the Census measure will find that Unified Democrat Control does not predict
the degree to which states commit to welfare, whereas one who uses the Comprehensive
measure 2 will conclude that who controls a state government matters for state spending
on welfare. Similarly, some who use the Census measure will find a relatively small
effect of Hispanic compared to those who employ the Comprehensive measure 1.

3.7 Discussion and Conclusion
This study analyzes a series of a panel data model with state and year fixed effects
to empirically test whether the choice of the indicators of state welfare commitment
makes any difference for the findings in studies of state welfare policy determinants. This
paper adds value to the literature in that it gives attention to the dependent variable—i.e.,
state welfare policy—and focuses on how different scholars define and operationalize it.
While many scholars have examined state welfare policy producing diverse studies, the
discussion of how we define and measure state welfare policy is surprisingly scarce. The
natural corollary of this is that we do not know whether the selection of dependent
variables matters for the findings in studies of state welfare policy. After assessing the
literature as a whole as to whether studies have found consistent or inconsistent results on
their key independent variables of interest, I hypothesized that there would be differences
in coefficients of independent variables depending on which measure of state welfare
commitment we investigate as a dependent variable.
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The findings support the hypothesis. The empirical results show that the measures
we use shape the kinds of results we get. Whether the coefficient of independent
variables matters for state welfare commitment differs across the models using different
measures of state welfare commitment as a dependent variable. What these findings
imply is that studies of state welfare policy and politics appears to be examining the same
phenomenon on the surface but they could be telling us about different parts of welfare
policy, and not about welfare policy more generally. Inconsistency in the empirical
results across the models also implies that the findings are not robust across different
model specifications. Therefore, this study highlights that it is important to have better
understanding of what we examine as a phenomenon and we need to be cautious about
reporting the empirical results.
Then, what might explain the differences in the findings across the models
examined in this study? Regarding the influence of Unemployment, it is likely that the
two broader measures of state welfare commitment capture an underlying phenomenon
that the narrower measure does not pick up, thus producing the difference in the findings.
Recall that the estimation results show that unemployment rate matters in two models
where I use broader conceptions of welfare; however, it is not statistically significant and
even negatively signed in the other model with the dependent variable reflecting the
narrower definition of welfare. On the one hand, the inclusion of spending on
Unemployment Insurance and Workers’ Compensation in the measures of state welfare
commitment could make the change in unemployment rate possible to capture the
variation in broader measures across states mainly because the two programs serve
unemployed individuals. On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that the association
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between unemployment rate and state welfare commitment in Model 2 and Model 3 has
to do with unobserved dynamics that political power of unions brings into state welfare
policy making.
Similarly, Unified Democrat Control determines state welfare commitment in the
two models using the broader measures, whereas it does not matter in the model with the
narrowest measure. Moreover, its marginal effect is not close to identical across the
models; the effect is shown to be larger in Model 2 and Model 3 compared to Model 1.
Again, these results could be suggesting that there are underlying dynamics related to
organized interests such as unions which are not adequately captured in these models but
presumably closely related with the working of partisan control in determining state
welfare commitment. Unions are better organized and politically active than welfare
recipients, so it is easier for unions to mobilize political power to influence welfare
policies at their stake. It could be that this relationship between unions and partisan
control produces the results we see in Model 2 and Model 3. However, it seems that this
underlying dynamic is not at work in states’ decision making when only narrowly defined
welfare policies are considered.
Lastly, the results indicate that the marginal effects of Hispanic are greater in
Model 2 and Model 3 than in Model 1, and they are statistically different from one
another across the three models. Also, contrary to findings from previous studies (Preuhs,
2007; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012), the effect of Hispanic is positive, meaning that a
state with a greater percentage of Hispanic population tends to show greater commitment
to state welfare programs. In fact, the measure of Hispanic used in this study might not be
good enough to capture a backlash effect on welfare spending, and rather reflects a
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growing trend, and thus increasing demand for welfare, in Hispanic population in the
U.S. during the time period examined. From 2000 to 2010, the number of Hispanic
increased by 44.1%, which was the second fastest growing ethnic/racial group following
Asian. The increase accounted for 55.6% of total population growth during that time
(Pew Research Center, 2012). The percentage of Hispanic children under 18 increased
from 17.2% to 23.2% during the same period (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and
Family Statistics, 2017). In addition, statistics show that Hispanic workers suffer more
injuries and illness at their work place than any other ethnic/racial group (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, various years). All these statistics suggest the possibility that state
spending on public education and Workers’ Compensation are affected by the growth of
Hispanic population, which is probably why I find a strong association between Hispanic
and the two broader measures of state welfare commitment.
This study opens up new questions that call for further empirical research. While
previous studies have shown whether and why a particular factor matters, the findings in
this paper motivate us to ask, for example, why a certain factor matters for a particular
kind of welfare commitment measure but not others. I discuss possible scenarios as to
why I have different results across the models, but future research can further delve into
this question. Eventually, this study provides better grounding for future studies that
examine the question of who gets what and the associated politics of state welfare policy.
Thinking through what a dependent variable truly measures would help interpreting
implications from empirical results, which would in turn advance theories of state welfare
policy making.
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CHAPTER 4
DESERVINGNESS AND STATE WELFARE POLITICS IN THE
POST-WELFARE REFORM ERA
4.1 Introduction
Students of state welfare policy have long been interested in the underlying
mechanisms that determine who gets what from governmental decisions, and in
particular, associated politics of welfare policy has been at the center of their inquiry.
Wide variation in welfare policy across states has provided a perfect setting to uncover
and understand state welfare politics. Among other aspects, scholars have paid attention
to the generosity of welfare policies—that is, to what extent a state is generous in
providing welfare benefits to individuals or families who are recipients or potential
recipients of welfare benefits (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Jennings, 1979; Preuhs, 2006;
Reingold & Smith, 2012; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997).
Compared to the pre-welfare reform period, the 1996 welfare reform sparked greater
scholarly attention, making it a watershed moment in the history of American welfare
states. While this historical event leads to a number of scholarly work in the post-welfare
reform era, a majority of studies focus on examining the generosity of cash benefit levels,
eligibility rules, or strictness of sanctions (Avery & Peffley, 2005; Fellowes & Rowe,
2004; Filindra, 2002; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).
The limited scope of scrutiny in the literature limits our understanding of state
welfare politics in the period after the reform. Has the politics of welfare generosity in the
American states changed since the welfare reform of 1996? In particular, does the effect
of party politics differ across welfare policies? This paper aims to answer this question
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and updates the previous scholarship on state welfare politics regarding generosity. I pay
particular attention to the notion of deservingness of target populations, and examine
three welfare policies for different target populations to explore the nuance of welfare
politics associated with generosity. Findings from earlier studies, albeit only a few,
suggest that politics might differ across welfare policies serving different target
populations (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003). Stereotyping welfare
recipients as deserving or undeserving poor can be traced back to the 18th century (Katz,
1989; Patterson, 1994). However, the welfare reform which changed the landscape of
welfare in the American states might also have affected the way the public view welfare
policies and recipients of welfare as well.
The examination of three welfare policies reveals that party politics still remains
as an important factor in explaining state welfare generosity. However, its significant
effect is more pronounced in welfare policy for the undeserving poor, and the direction of
effect is not always consistent with what previous studies find. Overall, this study
suggests that the deservingness of target populations plays a role in the way in which
politics produces welfare generosity across states. I conclude by discussing the direction
future efforts might head to shed light on unexpected findings of this study and more
generally state welfare politics in the post-welfare reform environment.

4.2 Studies on Deservingness and State Welfare Politics
The notion of deservingness of the poor has been around for a century in the
history of the American welfare state (Katz, 1989). People more than often depict welfare
recipients as the “deserving” or “undeserving” poor; the distinction among the poor
frequently appears in media discourses and political rhetoric when commentators discuss
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welfare policy issues. We observed in the debate over the welfare reform in 1996 that this
distinction has grown sharper; as a way of reducing welfare dependency, welfare
programs introduced work requirements as a condition to receive benefits. Many
programs were redesigned to help individuals who work, characterizing those without
jobs as undeserving of public assistance (Moffitt, 2015).
The deservingness literature argues that the perceived deservingness of welfare
recipients is a key driver of support for welfare policies; how people judge recipients in
terms of deservingness of help influences public opinion and attitude of welfare programs
and benefits (Appelbaum, 2001; Petersen, 2012; van Oorschot, 2000). Although a
majority of these studies investigate European countries, scholars find that the
perceptions of welfare recipients affecting people’s willingness to support welfare is
universal across different countries (Petersen, 2012; Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, &
Tooby, 2012; van Oorschot, 2000).
An extensive literature in political psychology examines what criteria people use
to distinguish those who deserve welfare benefits from those who do not. Studies
demonstrate that people make this distinction by looking at whether individuals are
responsible for their deprivation and whether they make efforts to alleviate the need to
get help from welfare (Cavaillé, 2015; Gilens, 1999; Petersen, 2012; Petersen et al., 2012;
Thomann & Rapp, 2018; van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorshot, 2006). The “deserving” poor
are people who do not intend to be in a needy situation but they are affected by factors
beyond their control. They are perceived as individuals who cannot work even if they
wish to, and thus they are not expected to work and are considered as deserving of help.
On the contrary, the “undeserving” poor are those who are perceived to be responsible for
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their neediness. They are perceived as making a choice not to work and prefer to live off
public assistance because they are lazy. In this regard, the elderly, the sick, people with
severe disability, and children deserve welfare, whereas people who do not work
although they are capable of working do not. As such, findings from deservingness
studies imply that the politics of welfare policy would be different depending on how the
public judges the deservingness of welfare recipients. Policymakers do care about public
opinion, and there is robust evidence that public opinion influence policymakers and
policy making (Burstein, 2003; 2010).
Meanwhile, the social construction theory provides a stronger rationale as to why
we would expect the politics of welfare to be different across welfare policies that serve
different target populations. In fact, it directs our attention to look at the link between the
deservingness of target populations and policy design, and thus provides a theoretical
grounding to believe that policymakers may treat policies for the deserving poor
differently from those for the undeserving poor. According to Schneider and Ingram
(1993), the reason why some groups are advantaged from public policies more than
others can be explained by the social construction of a target population and the power of
that group. Social construction is a stereotype of a group of people that is built through
ideology, culture, politics, and history, which is closely linked with whether a group is
viewed as deserving or undeserving of help. Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that a
target population would get either symbolic or substantial benefits/burdens from policies
depending on how it is viewed from public and politicians in terms of social construction
and whether that population possesses political power. Target populations can be
categorized into four groups—i.e., Advantaged, Contenders, Dependents, and Deviants—
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by looking at whether they have positive or negative social construction—i.e., deserved
by the public—or whether they are politically powerful or not. Policymakers concerned
with re-election respond to the social construction of target populations through policy
design because they can gain political support from their electorates through “feedforward” effects. In addition, policymakers have incentives to reinforce or alter the social
construction through policy design as they see it benefiting their electoral gains (Ingram,
Schneider, & deLeon, 2007, p. 106-107).
As such, research on deservingness and social construction suggests that welfare
politics surrounding policies for the deserving and undeserving poor would be distinctive.
However, only a few scholars have tested this proposition. Identifying general assistance
(GA) as a policy for the undeserving poor and Supplemental Security Income-State
Supplements (SSI-S) as a program for the deserving poor, Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003)
show, most importantly, that electoral competition exerts statistically significant
influence on welfare efforts of each program in an opposite direction. Greater electoral
competition leads to an increase in SSI-S effort, while it results in a decrease in GA
effort. They also find that generosity of SSI-S, defined as SSI-S benefits per SSI
recipient, increases when a state has more liberal citizen ideology, a greater electoral
competition, and a higher percentage of African-Americans. They were not able to
examine GA generosity due to lack of reliable data. Although Bailey and Rom (2004) do
not specifically discuss the deservingness of target populations, they examined several
policies that presumably can be categorized into different categories in terms of
recipients’ deservingness—such as Medicaid, SSI-S, and Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)—and find that different factors explain policy outputs differently.
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Their results show, for example, that greater Democratic strength leads to an increase in
the cost and access of AFDC and Medicaid, while it is associated with a decrease in
Medicaid generosity, operationalized as expenditure per recipient.
These studies look at the period before the welfare reform in 1996 or the period
covering a few years after 1996. Therefore, we do not know whether their findings hold
in the post-reform era. It is possible that emphasis on work, especially in Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs, might influence the way the public and
policymakers view the policy and its target population and change welfare politics.
However, we do not know until we test it empirically. In the following section, I discuss
the choice of three welfare policies examined in this study and provide policy
backgrounds and states’ role in each policy.

4.3 State Discretion over Welfare Policies
While we do not have survey or study results that identify recipients of which
specific welfare policies the American public perceives as deserving versus undeserving,
both studies on deservingness and social construction of target populations provide a
guidance in choosing which state welfare policies to examine. Studies find that the public
views the elderly, the sick, people with disabilities, and children as deserving of public
assistance, while viewing unemployed people as undeserving (Larsen, 2006; van
Oorschot, 2000; 2006). Based on this finding, I choose Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income-State Supplements (SSI-S), and
Medicaid for comparison. While these are state-federal funded programs, state
governments play a key role in providing benefits and services through each program.
State governments exert discretion over important aspects of the program; for TANF and
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Medicaid, state governments are free to design each program to tailor it to the needs and
preferences of their citizen under general guidelines from the federal government. States
use flexibility in setting the TANF benefit level, among other policy choices, whereas
they decide which optional populations and medical services to cover under Medicaid.
For SSI-S, state governments decide whether to provide additional monetary benefits on
top of the federal SSI as well as the level of benefits they choose to provide.
Note, however, that these programs are different in terms of target populations
they serve. While TANF is often perceived as a program for the undeserving poor often
depicted as ‘welfare queens’ who are morally deficient and as lazy people who are
unwillingness to work (Bridges, 2017; Oorschot, 2006; Oorschot & Roosma, 2015), SSIS is a program that provides benefits to people who are over 65, blind, or have disabilities
(including children) but need assistance due to no fault of their own, i.e., a group that is
perceived as deserving poor (Bridges, 2017).
As the most expensive state welfare program, Medicaid plays an important role in
the U.S welfare system, covering 66 million people as of January 2019. While it is the
largest program, Medicaid is relatively ambiguous to categorize in terms of the
deservingness of the target population, partly because the target population is diverse. In
its inception, Medicaid was viewed as a program for the deserving poor since it was
initially started as medical support for recipients of cash welfare through vendor
payments in 1950 (Moore & Smith, 2005; Thompson, 2012). However, ten years later,
medical benefits were extended to cover people over 65 who would otherwise be unable
to pay medical costs. In 1965, when Medicaid program was signed into law, the
legislation mandated that states provide medical assistance also to people with disabilities
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and low-income families with children if they participate in the program. Over the last 25
years, the program has evolved to cover more people, including children and pregnant
women in low-income families (Moore & Smith, 2005; Kronebusch, 2001). Therefore,
comparing Medicaid together with the other two welfare programs would be useful to
investigate the nuance of welfare politics in states. In the following, I discuss the ways in
which state governments exert discretion over each program.
4.3.1 TANF
Jointly funded by the federal government and states, TANF programs provide
cash assistance and support services to low-income families with children. As the product
of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA), it replaced AFDC to “end welfare as we know it”. Many aspects mark stark
differences from the predecessor, AFDC. For example, while AFDC recipients had
access to cash welfare without a time limit, the bill set a time limit for TANF cash
benefits. Also, the federal government required work and work-related activities to
receive cash support. The most distinct difference, however, is that states have wide
latitude in designing and implementing TANF programs. Within broad federal guidelines,
states have discretion over the use of both federal TANF funds and state maintenance-ofeffort (MOE) funds and cater their own TANF programs to meet the needs of their

citizen. As a result, states vary considerably in the way they spend TANF money and in
the rules that govern cash assistant (Falk, 2011; 2016; Schott, Floyd, & Burnside, 2019).
4.3.2 SSI-S
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a federal means-tested welfare program
that provides nationwide cash benefits to the elderly, the blind, and people with disability
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(including children). Enacted in 1972, it started paying benefits in 1974, replacing state
funded and operated programs of assistance to the elderly, the blind, and those with
disabilities. As a national program, its eligibility requirements and minimum benefit
standards are set by the federal government. However, states can opt to provide
additional income support on top of federal SSI payments, which is known as optional
state supplements. 18 States’ discretion over the optional supplemental program is threefold. First, states make a decision on whether to offer this optional program. Second,
states that choose to supplement the federal SSI payments decide who administers the
supplemental payments. States may administer the programs themselves, request the
Social Security Administration (SSA) to administer their programs, or jointly administer
them with the SSA. Lastly, states that administer their own programs can make their own
eligibility criteria and decide the amount of payments for the optional state supplements.
Some states provide supplements for all who are eligible for SSI, and others selected
certain categories of SSI recipients. Also, there are states that extend the supplements to
those who are ineligible for SSI. However, if states choose to implement the
supplemental programs as federally-administered program, they must follow the rules of
SSA regarding eligibility criteria and payment amounts and pay a fee per each
supplemental payment to SSA. 19 As such, states can exercise discretion over state
supplemental payments, which generates variation across states in SSI-S generosity.
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In addition to optional state supplements, states have responsibility to provide mandatory state
supplements to keep the 1973 income levels of beneficiaries of the former state adult assistance programs
so that the beneficiaries do not lose benefits when they were converted to the SSI program in 1974.
Currently, mandatory payments apply to few people mainly due to the death and the increase in federal
benefit levels since its inception. SSA reports that there were roughly 1,900 recipients of mandatory
supplements nationally in 2000 (SSA, 2001).
19
A fee ranges from $7.60 to $8.77 per supplementary payment during the period examined in this study.
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4.3.3 Medicaid
Medicaid is by far the largest state welfare program; it provides primary and acute
medical services and long-term care services to low-income individuals and families. 20 It
is a means-tested entitlement program jointly funded by the federal government and the
states. The federal government matches state spending on Medicaid based on the Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). While it started, in 1965, as a health coverage
only for those who receive cash assistance, the program incrementally expanded to benefit
a broader population. Today, Medicaid covers not only low-income children and families
but also the aged, people with disabilities, the blind, and pregnant women and infants.
States have broad discretion to administer, design, and implement their own
Medicaid programs. While the federal government mandates that all states must meet
basic requirements such as providing certain types of services and covering certain
groups of individuals, known as the mandatory eligibility groups, states have discretion to
extend coverage beyond the federal mandatory eligibility groups, and they also can
determine which optional medical services to cover. Due to this flexibility given to states,
wide programmatic variation exists from state to state, leading to variation in Medicaid
generosity.

4.4 Hypotheses
The scholarly discussion on the social construction of target populations and
deservingness of the poor suggests that politics involved in generosity of state welfare
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In FY 2018, the estimated combined federal and state Medicaid expenditures account for 29.7% of total
state expenditures ($603,166 millions). State Medicaid is the second largest program area next to
elementary and secondary education, representing 17.1% of state funds ($233,271 millions) (NASBO,
2018).
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policy might differ across programs serving different target populations. Also, a couple of
studies provide empirical evidence that the target populations matter for state welfare
politics at least where the pre-reform era is concerned (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux
& Bernick, 2003). Building on the existing scholarship on state welfare politics, this
study tests hypotheses focusing on party politics. In particular, I examine the role of party
competition and party control in welfare policymaking. These two together with
government ideology are the most frequently examined political variables in the
literature, but the findings are not consistent across studies.
First, the degree of competition between two major parties is likely to influence
generosity of welfare policies differently depending on which target population policies
serve. In his analysis of Southern politics, V.O. Key (1949) argues that heightened
competition between the parties leads to policy outputs that are more responsive to the
needs of the disadvantaged. It is because parties facing increased competition or the risk
of electoral defeat have an incentive to appeal to constituencies as politicians seek votes,
whereas parties under a lower level of competition have little incentive to broaden their
electoral coalitions and represent median voters (Key, 1949). The empirical evidence is
somewhat mixed. While some studies find that electoral competition is not a good
predictor of welfare generosity or effort (Preuhs, 2006; 2007), others demonstrate that the
effect of electoral competition is conditioned by other factor to have positive relationship
with state welfare spending (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002). However, many
studies find that a state with more competitive party system tends to have overall more
liberal state policy (Barrilleaux, 1997), a higher cash benefits level (Hero & Preuhs,
2007; Ringquist et al., 1997), greater welfare effort (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003), and
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less strict sanctioning rules under TANF programs (Soss et al., 2001). More relevant to
this study is Barrilleaux & Bernick’s (2002) work which investigates the impact of
electoral competition on SSI-S and General Assistance (GA) programs. Consistent with
their expectation, they find that states with higher degree of electoral competition are
likely to spend more on SSI-S—i.e., the program for the deserving poor—but less on
GA—i.e., the program for the undeserving poor.
Given that the TANF program is perceived as a policy for the undeserving poor, it
is likely that heightened party competition lowers TANF generosity as politicians would
put efforts to win election by producing a policy that is more representative of the
preferences of state citizens over TANF, i.e., the preferences that are inferred by the
perceived deservingness on TANF recipients. Also, TANF recipients possess relatively
weak political power, and thus there is little incentive for politicians to appeal to them.
On the contrary, heightened party competition is likely to lead to increased SSI-S
generosity because SSI-S recipients are not only politically more active and powerful but
also have positive images as a group deserving public assistance. Therefore, I expect that
greater party competition will lead to more generous welfare policy for the deserving
poor but less generous policy for the undeserving poor. For Medicaid, the expectation is
not that straightforward, given that population benefiting from Medicaid contains a mix
of recipients, some of whom are perceived deserving and others of whom are perceived
undeserving. However, given that the 1996 welfare reform decoupled the link between
Medicaid eligibility and cash assistance (i.e., TANF), the stigma attached to Medicaid
and Medicaid recipients could have been weakened (Brecher & Rose, 2013). If this is the
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case, the political dynamics under Medicaid decision-making would resemble closer to
that of SSI-S rather than TANF.
Hypothesis 1: Party competition will have opposite effects on state welfare
generosity depending on the deservingness of target populations a policy serves.
Specifically, as party competition becomes heightened, a state will have a less
generous TANF policy but more generous SSI-S policy and Medicaid policy.
While I expect that party competition exerts an independent effect on the
generosity of a policy as stated in Hypothesis 1, the discussion above also suggests that
the effects of competition ought to depend on the direction of citizens’ preferences. More
liberal citizens tend to prefer more generous welfare policy. Therefore, I expect that the
joint effects of party competition and citizen liberalism on welfare generosity will be
positive regardless of the deservingness of a target population. As a results, it is also
expected that as citizens become more liberal, the positive effects of party competition on
the generosity of welfare policy for the deserving poor are likely to be reinforced;
however, the negative effects of competition on the generosity of welfare policy for the
undeserving poor would be weakened.
Hypothesis 2: The effect of party competition will be conditioned by the relative
liberalism of state citizens. Specifically, as citizens become more liberal, party
competition will exert a stronger effect on the generosity of TANF, SSI-S, and
Medicaid policy.
Next, state discretion over each program allows partisan control of state
government to influence generosity of a given program. Together with party competition,
partisan control is one of the most frequently examined political variable in the literature.
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The literature typically finds that greater presence of Democrats in or Democratic control
over a state government is associated with more generous welfare policy; under
Democratic control, states are likely to adopt less strict rules under TANF programs
(Avery & Peffley, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004), provide more generous cash benefits
(Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Preuhs, 2006; Ringquist et al., 1997), and exert greater welfare
efforts (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Hwang & Gray, 1991). However, some studies find
evidence that more Democrats in control does not necessarily affect welfare policies to
benefit the disadvantaged more (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003;
Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Kousser, 2002). The findings from Bailey and Rom (2004) and
Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003) suggest that the impact of partisan control might differ
depending on which welfare policy we examine. Both studies examine multiple welfare
policies which are presumably for different target populations with different perceived
deservingness and show that the degree of Democratic strength influences welfare
policies differently.
Following the prevailing findings in the literature, however, I expect that states
with unified Democratic control of both houses of the legislature and the executive will
shape a welfare policy more favorable to the poor because, on average, Democratic
parties are relatively more liberal than Republican parties. I do not expect that unified
Democratic control will negatively affect welfare generosity for the undeserving poor—
i.e., TANF. Although TANF and SSI-S target different populations in terms of their
deservingness of welfare benefits, the fact that both are welfare policies does not change.
The perceived undeservingness of TANF recipients is less likely to nullify the tendency
that Democrats produce relatively more liberal policies compared to Republicans. In the
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same vein, the effect of unified Republican control is expected to work the same way;
regardless of a welfare policy examined, unified Republican control will produce policy
output less favorable to the poor. In short, the expected direction of the influence of
unified Democrat control or that of unified Republic control on each of these policies
should not differ across the policies. However, I expect that the presence of unified
Democrat control decreases Medicaid generosity, if any, while unified Republic control
of the state government increases Medicaid generosity. Note that the measure of
Medicaid generosity is obtained by dividing state total Medicaid expenditures by
Medicaid enrollees. Previous studies on Medicaid find that Republican control leads to a
decrease in the number of enrollees due to less spending on Medicaid, which in turn
results in more spending per enrollees (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Kronebusch, 1993).
Therefore, the two hypotheses follow.
Hypothesis 3-1: A state with unified Democratic control of the state government will
have a more generous welfare policy than a state with full control by Republicans or
split control; and the direction of effect will be the same for a welfare policy for the
deserving and undeserving poor. However, unified Democratic control in a state will
reduce Medicaid generosity.
Hypothesis 3-2: A state with unified Republican control of the state government will
have a less generous welfare policy than a state with full control by Democrats or
split control; and the direction of effect will be the same for a welfare policy for the
deserving and undeserving poor. However, unified Republican control in a state will
increase Medicaid generosity.
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4.5 Methods
4.5.1 Welfare Generosity Models
To find out whether the influence of various factors on state welfare generosity
differs across the three programs, I estimate three models with similar independent
variables. For all three models, I initially planned to use the Arellano-Bond (1991)
estimation technique because I modeled welfare generosity as a dynamic process in
which generosity changes incrementally over time. Since state and year fixed effects are
included together with a lagged dependent variable, obtaining OLS or GLS estimators
would results in inconsistent estimators due to autocorrelation between the lagged
dependent variable and residuals. The Arellano-Bond generalized method-of-moments
estimator deals with this problem by allowing lagged values of the dependent variable to
be included in the model as an additional independent variable. However, TANF and
Medicaid models failed the test of instrument variables being uncorrelated with error
terms, indicating that the Arellano-Bond is not a valid method for examining TANF and
Medicaid generosity. A further test of unit root in dependent variables of TANF and
Medicaid generosity models shows that unit roots are present in the measure of Medicaid
generosity while they are not in the measure of TANF generosity. 21 Therefore, I use the
fixed effects model for TANF and the first difference model for Medicaid. By
differencing each variable in the Medicaid model, I can remove all unobserved timeinvariant characteristics within the states which may impact the independent and the
dependent variables. The fixed effects estimator can work the same way with regard to
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The unit root test of TANF generosity measure rejects the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit
roots (p-value<0.0001), whereas that of Medicaid generosity measure fails to reject the null (p-value ranges
from 0.30 to 0.76).
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dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. However, the first difference estimator is more
efficient than the fixed effects estimator if the error term in the original model—i.e., the
model with variables before differencing—follows a random walk, in other words, if
there is serial correlation in the error term, which is the case in Medicaid generosity. Both
TANF and Medicaid models are estimated by OLS with standard error clustered at the
state level. Meanwhile, I am able to use the Arellano-Bond estimation technique with
state and year fixed effects for SSI-S program, as I initially planned. In the Appendix C, I
discuss the results of post-estimation diagnostic tests for the Arellano-Bond estimation.
For TANF and Medicaid generosity models, the data cover 49 states excluding
Nebraska as it has a non-partisan state legislature. The SSI-S generosity model estimates
47 states; it excludes Nebraska, Missouri, and North Dakota. Missouri and North Dakota
are omitted as there is inconsistency in reporting their SSI-S payment data. Although I
focus on the period after the welfare reform in 1996, due to the difference in availability
of the data on dependent variables, the years covered by these models are not identical to
each other; the TANF model provides estimates for the period from FY 1999 to FY 2010,
the SSI-S model from FY 2002 to FY 2004, and the Medicaid model from FY 2002 to
FY 2010.
The specific form of each model is as follows:
TANF Generosity: Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 + µs + λt + εs,t ,
where Y is TANF generosity in state s at time t. Xs,t-1 is the vector of political,
economic, programmatic, and demographic factors of state s at time t-1. µs is the
unobserved time-invariant state effects, and λt is the fixed effects of year. εs,t is a random
error term of state s at time t.
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SSI-S Generosity: Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 +β2Ys,t-1 + ΣρtDt + εs,t ,
where Ys,t is SSI-S generosity in state s at time t. Ys,t-1 denotes a lagged dependent
variable. Xs,t-1 is a vector of political, economic, programmatic, and demographic factors
of state s at time t-1. Dt indicates a year dummy variable. ε s,t is a random error term of
state s at time t.
Medicaid Generosity: ΔYs,t = α0+ β1ΔXs,t-1 + ΣρtDt + Δεs,t ,
where Δ denotes the change from t-1 to t. Therefore, ΔY is the change in Medicaid
generosity from t-1 to t in state s. ΔXs,t-1 is the change in a vector of political, economic,
programmatic, and demographic factors from t-2 to t-1 of state s. Dt indicates a year
dummy variable, and Δεs,t is the change in a random error term from t-1 to t in state s.
4.5.2 Dependent Variables
For TANF and Medicaid program, I operationalize welfare generosity as per
recipient state total expenditures for a given program. I use state expenditures funded by
state own resources excluding federal share in total expenditures of each program.
Therefore, state total TANF expenditures include state TANF spending through state
MOE contribution in state TANF programs and state separate programs. Note that the
TANF spending data I use is limited to spending under the “assistance” expenditure
category only. It is because available TANF caseload data count only the individuals
receiving TANF “assistance” and exclude recipients of “non-assistance”. Assistance
expenditures include basic assistance (aka, cash assistance) and other benefits to
unemployed families such as child care and transportation. Expenditures on nonassistance includes work subsidies to employers, education/training, child care and
transportation for employed families, and refundable tax credits such as state EITC. I
89

obtain the financial data from the Administration for Children and Families (ACF).
Therefore, focusing on assistance is likely to reveal welfare politics for the undeserving
poor more clearly as unemployed people on welfare will have less favorable social
construction than people who are working but still need help.
I calculate state Medicaid expenditures (including Children's Health Insurance
Program) by multiplying combined state and federal Medicaid spending by the Federal
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). The data comes from the Medical Statistical
Information System (MSIS) database. MSIS is a reporting system through which the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) collects Medicaid data from states.
CMS website provides publically available state summary tables that contains aggregated
level statistics relating to Medicaid eligibles, beneficiaries, and payments for Medicaid
services.
To measure SSI-S generosity, however, I use per recipient annual average state
total SSI-S benefit payments (both mandatory and optional supplements), which captures
the dollar amount that each SSI-S recipients receives on average. Supplements
administered by state and federal government are both taken into account. It would be
ideal to examine a welfare generosity measure operationalized in the same way across the
three programs, but SSI-S spending data are only available for benefit payments. Given
that the main function of SSI-S program is to provide additional cash assistance to
recipients, I assume that the results of using a SSI-S generosity measure that takes into
account administrative costs of the program would not make discernible differences from
what I present here.
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4.5.3 Key Independent Variables
My principle theoretical interest is in party politics regarding party competition
and partisan control. First, I test the impact of party competitions through two different
measures: Inter-Party Competition and Electoral Competition. For Inter-Party
Competition, this study uses the “folded” Ranney (1976) index, which measures the
degree of competition between two parties for control of a state government using the
partisan composition of state legislatures, the vote share for the parties’ gubernatorial
candidates, and the percentage of time that the parties held both the governorship and a
majority in the state legislature (Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). The “folded”
Ranney (1976) index ranges from 0.5 to 1, 0.5 denoting one party dominance and 1
indicating perfect competition between the two parties. For Electoral Competition, this
study uses Holbrook and Van Dunk’s (1993) (HVD) measure that utilizes the data on
district-level state legislative elections, more specifically on the information on vote won
by winners in a district, the margin of victory, whether the seat is safe, and whether the
election was contested (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993).
Compared to the Ranney index, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) provides a more direct
measure of overall electoral competitiveness of individual state legislative elections, thus
focusing on electoral dynamics. The measure ranges from 0 to 100, 100 indicating most
competitive environment.
Inspired by V. O. Key’s (1949) proposition on inter-party competition, scholars
have tested inter-party competition and electoral competition interchangeably although
both evaluate different concepts (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin,
2012). Therefore, we do not know how the subtle difference in these measures plays out a
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role in state welfare policymaking. Since the Ranney index and HVD measure do not
highly correlated which other, I test the effect of both variables in a single model.
Second, to test the effect of partisan control on welfare generosity, I include
Unified Democratic Control and Unified Republican Control, indicating whether
Democrats or Republicans control all branches of a state government. It takes a value of
one when Democrats (or Republicans) control both state legislatures and governorship,
and otherwise zero. The measures come from Klarner’s dataset on state partisan balance
(Klarner, 2013b). Among many other partisan control variables in the dataset, I use the
variables that take veto proof majorities and super-majority requirements for budget
passage into account to code the party “truly” in control of state government (Klarner,
2013b). Some previous studies use different measures of partisan control such as a
separate measure for legislatures and governorship (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012) or
rather use Democratic strength in state legislatures measured as a number or a percentage
of legislative seats held by Democrats (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Gilligan & Matsusaka,
1995; Krueger & Muller, 2001). The interest in this study is to examine whether a full
Democratic control or Republican control of the decision making bodies in the state
government produces similar policy output in terms of generosity of welfare policies for
different target populations. Therefore, I construct these variables to reflect control over
both executive and legislative branches. Compared to divided government, unified
Democratic control (unified Republican control) would make Democrats (Republicans)
easier to realize a policy that is relatively closer to their ideological orientation.
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4.5.4 Controls
Beyond party politics variables, I add other relevant political, economic,
programmatic, and demographic variables to the models. These variables are included in
all three models, if I do not mention otherwise. The political variables include
government liberalism and citizen liberalism. Government Liberalism: It measures the
relative liberalism of a state government, i.e., how close to the left state elected officials
stand on the ideological continuum. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording, Ringquist,
Hanson, and Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government ideology (0 to
100), with larger numbers indicating a more liberal government ideology. While the
findings are mixed, there is empirical evidence that states with more liberal government
ideology are more generous in terms of welfare spending level (Hill & Leighley, 1992)
and adopt less strict TANF rules (Avery & Peffley, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Soss
et al., 2001). Citizen Liberalism: This variable measures the relative liberalism of citizens
in each state. The data for this variable comes from an updated version of Berry et al.’s
(1998) study on the measure of citizen and government ideology in the American states
(0-100), with larger numbers reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. Studies generally
find that a state with more liberal citizens tends to adopt more generous welfare policy
(Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Ringquist et al., 1997; Reingold
& Smith, 2012).
Economic factors include income, wage, and unemployment rate. Income: This
variable indicates fiscal capacity of a state, measured as log of per capita state personal
income. States with greater fiscal capacity have a tendency to spend more on welfare
programs (Hill & Leighly, 1992; Krueger & Muller, 2002; Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995;
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Kousser, 2002). Wage: This is operationalized as log of mean annual wage in a state. In
response to a decrease in workers’ wage, policymakers might make welfare policy more
generous, or alternatively, they might produce less generous welfare policy to avoid
welfare dependency among the poor (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Berry, Rom, & Hanson,
2003). Unemployment: This variable is measured as the percentage of state labor force
who are unemployed. This variable shows how well a state is doing economically. Under
stronger economy, policymakers might push people out of welfare and to the labor
market by limiting the use of welfare programs (Avery & Peffley, 2003; Jennings, 1983;
Soss et al., 2001), but it is also likely that they response with more generous welfare
policy because states has greater capacity to do so (Bailey & Rom, 2004).
I include two programmatic factors in each models. TANF Caseloads, SSI-S
Recipients, and Medicaid Enrollees: These are measured as the percentage of state annual
TANF caseloads in total female population aged 15-44, the percentage of state SSI-S
recipients in state total population, and the percentage of state Medicaid enrollees in state
total population. For these variables only, I include both a one-year lag and a two-year
lag in the models to see whether there are delayed effects. Federal Share: This variable is
measured as the percentage of federal contribution in total program expenditures. It is
expected that additional federal dollars induce states and especially poorer state to put
more financial resource on welfare programs and thereby increase welfare efforts or
generosity although it is not always the case (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux et al.,
2002; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012).
Lastly, I have a few demographic factors. African-American and Hispanic: These
two variables measure the proportion of state population that is African-American and
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Hispanic, respectively. Previous studies find a backlash effect when the presence of these
minority groups in total population is greater (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003;
Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Preuhs, 2007; Soss et al., 2001; Wright, 1977). Poverty:
This is the percentage of state population living below the federal poverty level. States
with a higher poverty rate might be more generous as policymakers react to the increased
demand, but they could also make policy less generous in an effort to discourage welfare
dependency (Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Soss et al., 2001). Elderly: This indicates the
percentage of people over 65 in the state population. This variable is included in SSI-S
and Medicaid models. As senior citizens are politically more active, they are likely to
influence the generosity of welfare policies from which they benefit. Disability: It
measures the percentage of people with working disabilities in state population and is
included in SSI-S and Medicaid models. Children: This is the percentage of people under
18 in state population. It is included in the Medicaid model only. Single Mother
Household and Non-Marital Birth: The former measures the percentage of households
led by a single mother, and the latter indicates the percentage of births out-of-wedlock.
They are only included in the TANF model to see whether state policymakers make
welfare policy less generous as a means to punish growing immoral behavior (Soss et al.,
2001).
Since the dependent variables use fiscal year data, I use a one-year lag for all
independent variables. For TANF Caseloads, SSI-S Recipients and Medicaid Enrollees,
however, each model has a two-year lag in addition to a one-year lag. Tweedie (1994)
finds that an increase in the proportion of AFDC recipients in a state from two years prior
lowers the change in AFDC benefit levels, suggesting that policymakers’ response might
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not be immediate (Peterson & Rom, 1989). Based on this finding, I include a two-year
lag of caseload variable in each model to take into account the possibility of delayed
effects on welfare generosity. All dollar terms are adjusted to 2010 (TANF and Medicaid)
or 2004 (SSI-S) constant U.S. dollars using the state Consumer Price Index developed by
Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2014). Table 4.1 through Table 4.3 presents the descriptive
statistics of variables used in the models. Details on all dependent and independent
variable measures and sources of the data are summarized in Table C.2 in the Appendix C.
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables in TANF Generosity Model for FY 1999FY 2010
Variable
TANF Generosity
L. Inter-Party Competition
L. Electoral Competition
L. Unified Democratic Control
L. Unified Republican Control
L. Government Liberalism
L. Citizen Liberalism
L. Unemployment
L. Income
L. Wage
L. TANF Caseloads
L2. TANF Caseloads
L. Federal Share
L. African-American
L. Hispanic
L. Single Mother Household
L. Non-Marital Birth
L. Poverty

Unit
$
0.5-1
0-100
0/1
0/1
0-100
0-100
%
Log, $
Log, $
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Obs
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588
588

Mean
94.51
0.88
38.71
0.27
0.26
47.83
52.58
5.13
-3.28
10.60
36.54
39.58
63.54
10.50
8.88
5.27
35.42
11.91

S.D
143.16
0.09
11.05
0.45
0.44
13.70
15.63
1.64
0.16
0.12
18.70
20.91
11.66
9.60
9.39
0.99
6.60
3.14

Min
-377.32
0.64
12.05
0
0
17.56
8.45
2.30
-3.61
10.35
3.05
3.05
4.38
0.31
0.54
2.95
16.70
4.50

Max
1,596.67
1
63.10
1
1
73.62
95.97
13.70
-2.77
10.89
114.92
134.36
171.06
37.08
46.03
8.67
55
23.10

Note: The statistics are for 49 states excluding Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year
except L2. TANF Caseload which is lagged by two years.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables of SSI-S Generosity Model for FY 2002FY 2004
Variable
SSI-S Generosity
L. SSI-S Generosity
L. Inter-Party Competition
L. Electoral Competition
L. Unified Democratic Control
L. Unified Republican Control
L. Government Liberalism
L. Citizen Liberalism
L. Income
L. Wage
L. Unemployment
L. SSI-S Recipients
L2. SSI-S Recipients
L. Federal Share
L. African-American
L. Hispanic
L. Disability
L. Elderly
L. Poverty

Unit
$
$
0.5-1
0-100
0/1
0/1
0-100
0-100
Log, $
Log, $
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Obs
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141
141

Mean
1,712.50
1,615.95
0.88
37.47
0.23
0.25
47.07
49.71
-3.30
10.61
5.20
0.80
0.83
90.58
10.57
8.75
7.89
12.43
11.62

S.D
1,925.24
1,724.24
0.09
10.70
0.42
0.43
13.39
15.46
0.16
0.12
1.06
1.02
1.02
13.73
9.72
9.30
1.97
1.84
3.19

Min
0
0
0.64
16.73
0
0
23.74
8.45
-3.55
10.40
3.10
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.35
0.73
4.70
5.90
5.80

Max
11,616.02
11,616.02
1
58.01
1
1
71.84
95.97
-2.85
10.87
8.10
3.30
3.25
100
36.48
43.54
14.90
17.32
19.80

Note: The statistics are for 47 states excluding Nebraska, Missouri, and North Dakota. All independent
variables are lagged by one year except L2. SSI-S Recipients which is lagged by two years.

Table 4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Medicaid Generosity Model for FY 2002FY 2010
Variable
Medicaid Generosity
L. Inter-Party Competition
L. Electoral Competition
L. Unified Democratic Control
L. Unified Republican Control
L. Government Liberalism
L. Citizen Liberalism
L. Nursing Homes
L. Hospitals
L. Doctors

Unit
$
0.5-1
0-100
0/1
0/1
0-100
0-100
Per 100k
Per 100k
Per 100k

Obs
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
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Mean
2,334.41
0.88
38.46
0.28
0.25
48.35
54.09
6.42
2.26
254.48

S.D
947.84
0.08
11.38
0.45
0.43
13.68
15.64
3.05
1.36
62.25

Min
778.41
0.64
12.05
0
0
17.56
8.45
1.81
0.63
156.37

Max
5,039.19
1.00
63.10
1
1
73.62
95.97
15.89
6.71
479.50

Table 4.3 (continued)
Variable
L. Income
L. Wage
L. Unemployment
L. Medicaid Enrollees
L2. Medicaid Enrollees
L. Federal Share
L. African-American
L. Hispanic
L. Disability
L. Elderly
L. Children
L. Poverty

Unit
Log, $
Log, $
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%
%

Obs
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441
441

Mean
-3.26
10.61
5.38
17.41
16.89
60.28
10.53
9.32
8.13
12.68
24.69
12.06

S.D
0.15
0.12
1.65
5.04
4.99
8.33
9.59
9.53
2.05
1.75
1.79
3.13

Min
-3.55
10.39
2.60
7.33
6.84
50
0.35
0.73
4.50
5.90
20.88
5.40

Max
-2.77
10.89
13.70
35.13
35.13
77.08
37.08
46.03
16.20
17.32
31.83
23.10

Note: The statistics are for original variables, not differenced variables, covering 49 states excluding
Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year except L2. Medicaid Enrollees which is lagged
by two years.

4.6 Results
4.6.1 Party Politics Variables
Table 4.4 presents the coefficients for party politics variables across the three
welfare programs. Overall, the results show that the importance of these variables varies
across the programs. First, there is no significant independent effects from inter-party
competition and electoral competition in all three generosity models, which fails to
provide support for Hypothesis 1. However, the interaction term between inter-party
competition and citizen ideology is statistically significant in an expected direction in the
SSI-S model, and the interaction term between electoral competition and citizen ideology
is statistically significant in an expected direction in the Medicaid model, while both are
not significant predictors of TANF generosity. In the SSI-S model, the interaction
between inter-party competition and citizen liberalism is positively signed and
statistically significant (p<0.10). It indicates that citizen ideological preferences
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conditions the impact of inter-party competition in a way that the impact on SSI-S
generosity increases as citizens become more liberal. In the Medicaid model, the
interaction between electoral competition and citizen liberalism is positively signed and
statistically significant (p<0.05). It means that that the influence from electoral
competition on Medicaid generosity is augmented as state citizens lean toward a more
liberal side of the political spectrum. Therefore, the results provide partial support for
Hypothesis 2.
Table 4.4. Results for Party Politics Variables Across Three Welfare Policies
Party Politics Variable

TANF

SSI-S

Medicaid

Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism

0.09
(2.74)
0.01
(0.03)
-29.78**
(12.38)
20.4
(17.27)
-24.24
(165.43)
-2.63
(1.81)

219.35*
(129.44)
-1.84
(1.43)
1,436.75**
(514.00)
-428.63
(396.77)
-8,785.18
(7,194.39)
41.81
(74.54)

16.42
(16.64)
0.23**
(0.11)
-12.02
(43.22)
84.63*
(51.27)
-51.03
(1,034.80)
-11.08
(7.75)

Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Unified Democratic Control
Unified Republican Control
Inter-Party Competition
Electoral Competition
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

Next, unified Democratic control is statistically significant in TANF and SSI-S
models, but it exerts influence in an opposite direction in the two models (p<0.05). A
state with full Democratic control is likely to be less generous in TANF program but
more generous in SSI-S program than a state with different partisan composition of a
state government, taking everything else into account. These results fail to provide
support for Hypothesis 3-1 which posits that Democrats’ full control over the state
government will lead to more generous welfare policy regardless of the deservingness of
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target populations. Meanwhile, unified Republican control is statistically significant and
positive only in the Medicaid model, meaning that states tend to have more generous
Medicaid policy under the full Republican control. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3-2
with regard to Medicaid generosity. Overall, the results provide partial support for
Hypothesis 3-1 and 3-2.
4.6.2 Other Variables
Table 4.5 through Table 4.7 reports the estimates for all independent variables
from TANF, SSI-S, and Medicaid generosity models. A few other variables explain the
generosity of TANF programs. First, government liberalism exerts a positive impact on
TANF generosity (p<0.10); state governments with a more liberal ideology have more
generous TANF programs than state governments with a more conservative ideology.
Also, the percentage of TANF caseloads from the previous year has statistically
significant and negative effect (p<0.10), while that from two years prior has statistically
significant and positive effect on TANF generosity (p<0.05). Concerned with welfare
dependency, policymakers might make TANF policy less generous as TANF caseloads
from the previous year increases. The positive effect of TANF caseloads from two years
prior seems puzzling, and further investigation is needed for better understanding of the
phenomenon. Federal share is a statistically significant, positive predictor of state’s
TANF generosity (p<0.10). A greater percentage of federal money in TANF total
expenditures induces states to become more generous. Among demographic variables,
single mother household has statistically significant and negative impact on TANF
generosity (p<0.05). A state with a higher percentage of single mother headed household
tends to be less generous in TANF programs, which is consistent with a social
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construction interpretation. Negatively constructed images of single mothers seems to
affect policymaking to result in TANF policy unfavorable to the TANF recipients.
Meanwhile, the coefficient of African-American is statistically significant and negative,
indicating that there is a backlash effect (p<0.10).
In the SSI-S model, unemployment rate is a statistically significant and negative
predictor of SSI-S generosity (p<0.10). Rather than increasing generosity of SSI-S policy
by providing a greater supplemental benefit per recipient under stronger economy, states
seem to become less generous pushing people to find ways to support themselves in the
market. For Medicaid, the rate of nursing homes exerts statistically significant and
negative influence on the generosity of Medicaid (p<0.01). Also, the percentage of
Medicaid enrollees from the previous year exerts significant, positive influence on
Medicaid generosity (p<0.01). Unlike in the case of TANF policymaking where the
generosity of the program decreases as the previous year’s TANF caseloads increases,
policymakers seem to response to greater needs of medical services by increasing
Medicaid generosity.
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Table 4.5 Determinants of State TANF Generosity, FY 1999-FY 2010
Independent Variable
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Unified Democratic Control (0/1)
Unified Republican Control (0/1)
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1)
Electoral Competition (0-100)
Government Liberalism (0-100)
Citizen Liberalism (0-100)
Income (log, $)
Wage (log, $)
Unemployment (%)
TANF Caseloads (%)
TANF Caseloadst-2 (%)
Federal Share (%)
African-American (%)
Hispanic (%)
Single Mother Household (%)
Non-Marital Birth (%)
Poverty (%)
Constant
Observations
Number of Statesa
Number of Years

Coefficient
0.09
0.01
-29.78**
20.40
-24.24
-2.63
0.87*
-0.01
140.09
639.11
-0.01
-1.95*
2.29**
5.59*
-29.17*
2.69
-10.40**
-1.39
-0.15
-6,077.15
588
49
12

Standard Error
2.74
0.03
12.38
17.27
165.43
1.81
0.49
2.79
129.40
477.09
6.34
1.11
1.15
3.02
17.65
6.00
5.29
3.09
1.95
5,110.96

Note: Presented are estimates from the fixed effects model with state and year fixed effects using clustered
standard errors. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second TANF Caseloads
which is lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature.
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Table 4.6 Determinants of State SSI-S Generosity, FY 2002-FY 2004
Independent Variable
Lagged Dependent Variable ($)
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Unified Democratic Control (0/1)
Unified Republican Control (0/1)
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1)
Electoral Competition (0-100)
Government Liberalism (0-100)
Citizen Liberalism (0-100)
Income (log, $)
Wage (log, $)
Unemployment (%)
SSI-S Recipients (%)
SSI-S Recipientst-2 (%)
Federal Share (%)
African-American (%)
Hispanic (%)
Disability (%)
Elderly (%)
Poverty (%)
Constant
Observations
Number of Statesa
Number of Years
Arellano-Bond Test (order 1)
Arellano-Bond Test (order 2)
Sargan Test (p-value)

Coefficient
0.42
219.35*
-1.84
1,436.75***
-428.63
-8,785.18
41.81
0.43
-98.23
-7,021.07
5,022.57
-444.45*
-1,138.77
763.09
5.95
1,161.56
-19.15
85.70
-53.95
53.81
-81,516.36
141
47
3
0.08
0.43
0.99

Standard Error
0.38
129.44
1.43
514.00
396.77
7,194.39
74.54
14.96
123.91
6,421.83
9,622.83
239.91
815.89
1,187.64
12.11
1,011.65
422.66
89.51
1,042.94
76.20
111,085.70

Note: The table reports Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimates with the year fixed effects and the
conventional gmm standard error. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second SSI-S
Recipients which is lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. The statistic from Arellano-Bond test
(order 2) shows that there is no serial correlation in the residuals of order 2. The p-value of the Sargan test
indicates that conditions for overidentifying restrictions are met. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature. Missouri and North Dakota are
excluded due to inconsistency in reporting of their SSI-S payment data.
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Table 4.7 Determinants of Medicaid Generosity, FY 2002-FY 2010
Independent Variable
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism
Unified Democratic Control (0/1)
Unified Republican Control (0/1)
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1)
Electoral Competition (0-100)
Government Liberalism (0-100)
Citizen Liberalism (0-100)
Nursing Homes (per 100k)
Hospitals (per 100k)
Doctors (per 100k)
Income (log, $)
Wage (log, $)
Unemployment (%)
Medicaid Enrollees (%)
Medicaid Enrolleest-2 (%)
Federal Share (%)
African-American (%)
Hispanic (%)
Disability (%)
Elderly (%)
Children (%)
Poverty (%)
Constant
Observations
Number of Statesa
Number of Years

Coefficient
16.42
0.23**
-12.02
84.63*
-51.03
-11.08
1.93
-24.38
-198.56***
23.54
-0.01
281.24
-751.86
-21.78
31.89***
-4.39
-6.34
50.80
-18.21
-5.22
-41.64
-6.55
-1.89
100.43**
441
49
9

Standard Error
16.64
0.11
43.22
51.27
1,034.80
7.75
1.98
15.27
73.22
144.25
1.87
628.99
1,358.44
20.37
10.97
5.60
9.74
50.16
56.25
10.36
171.10
118.75
8.06
46.19

Note: Presented are estimates from the first difference model with year dummies using clustered standard
errors. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second Medicaid Enrollees which is
lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature.

4.7 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study, I analyze three welfare policies serving different target populations
to examine whether the nuance of state welfare politics differs across the policies. By
examining state welfare generosity across three different programs after the 1996 welfare
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reform, this study provides a valuable update and extension to the old debate regarding
party politics and its relationship to welfare policymaking. On the one hand, the results
from TANF, SSI-S, and Medicaid generosity models largely resonate the findings from
earlier period in that they show party politics play an important role in explaining welfare
generosity across states. This study finds that partisan control makes a difference for
welfare generosity, but its effect for welfare policies targeting the deserving poor is
opposite to its effect for policies targeting the undeserving poor. While I expect that
unified Democratic control will have positive influence on both TANF and SSI-S
generosity, it turns out that it has a positive effect on SSI-S generosity but a negative
effect on TANF generosity. The finding on TANF generosity echoes that of Fellowes and
Rowes (2004) and Barilleaux and Bernick (2003). Fellowes and Rowes (2004) find that a
state with greater presence of Democrats in state legislatures tends to provide a lower
level of TANF cash benefits, whereas Barilleaux and Bernick (2003) show that stronger
presence of Democrats in a state’s lower house decreases per capita GA spending. While
it is difficult to explain these unexpected findings of the earlier studies, it is probable that
this study finds the negative effect of unified Democratic control because full Democratic
control provides more access to TANF but the rate of spending increase does not outpace
that of recipients for some reason. Note that this study uses the TANF generosity measure
constructed from state TANF spending on assistance as oppose to total state TANF
spending. If total state TANF spending is considered, the finding of this partisan control
variable may or may not change. However, the reason behind this unexpected result must
remain open, given that TANF caseload data are collected only for individuals receiving
TANF assistance. Meanwhile, the significant and positive, albeit relatively weak, effect
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of unified Republican control on Medicaid generosity is consistent with what previous
studies suggest. It is likely that full Republican control leads to a decrease in the number
of enrollees due to preference for less access to Medicaid, which in turn could results in
more spending per enrollees (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Kronebusch, 1993).
On the other hand, the findings of this study offer an important point of departure
from the previous literature in thinking about how party competition is linked to welfare
generosity. This study provides a theoretical refinement by showing that party
competition plays a role only when it is interacted with citizen liberalism; there are a
significant and positive joint effect of inter-party competition and citizen liberalism and
that of electoral competition and citizen liberalism on welfare generosity, whereas interparty competition and electoral competition do not exert an independent influence.
Interestingly, this study shows that a different measure of party competition has a
significant conditioned impact on SSI-S and Medicaid, respectively; inter-party
competition affects SSI-S generosity jointly with citizen liberalism, while electoral
competition is important in explaining Medicaid generosity when it is interacted with
citizen liberalism. Given that previous studies investigate these party competition
variables only one at a time, it requires further examination to understand why different
party competition measures affect different welfare policies. Meanwhile, the results show
that TANF generosity is not susceptible to any party competition variables including the
interaction terms, which is unexpected given the finding of Barrilleaux and Bernick
(2003). One might conceive that the fact that work requirements became one of the
signature attributes of TANF programs unlike the predecessor—i.e., AFDC—from the
pre-welfare reform era might change the way policymakers and the public perceive the
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deservingness of TANF recipients, and thus weaken the linkage between party
competition and TANF generosity.
Overall, the findings lead to the conclusion that party politics is an important
factor explaining the generosity of state welfare policy, especially where welfare policy
for the deserving poor and mixed population is concerned. Despite these findings, some
cautionary notes should be sounded. First, different findings across the three generosity
models might be resulting from employing a different estimation technique for each
model. Although I follow the appropriate processes in choosing estimation methods, we
cannot zero out the possibility that findings would change if the same estimation
technique is applied to the three models. Second, limitations in TANF expenditure data
suggests caution in interpreting the results of the TANF generosity model. Since states
can make changes to previous TANF expenditure reports, there are occasions that
reported spending does not correctly reflect actual spending of a given fiscal year. As a
result, TANF expenditure data includes negative or zero values. In fact, the TANF
generosity measure includes 11 negative values and 18 zero values due to this accounting
practices, and treating these observations as missing yields slightly different results from
what I discuss earlier. The fact that the TANF data I use in this study is the only source
available across states suggests that there is a need for better data collecting practices.
Third, using different time periods for the different programs might affect the empirical
results, which creates concerns regarding comparability across the three programs. Due to
data availability, this study uses a much shorter period of time in examining SSI-S
generosity compared to the other two policies. It is reasonable to think that variability
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would be less in a shorter period than in a longer period, so utilizing variability in a
shorter period can reduce the chance of detecting significant results.
Additional research is needed to investigate different dimensions of generosity
across different welfare policies in the post-welfare reform era. Scholars have produced
extensive research on state welfare politics since the passage of PRWORA, but the
scholarship exclusively focuses on investigating eligibility generosity or sanctions
(Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Lukens, 2014; Soss et al., 2001) and interests in other
dimensions of generosity seems to have faded away. However, as shown in earlier
studies, broadening the scope of scrutiny to include different welfare policies and
different measures can help us detect subtle but meaningful differences in welfare
politics, which eventually enriches our understanding of who gets what and why in the
post-welfare reform era. Another path that future studies can take is to reconsider
traditional views on the working of various political factors and make an effort to
uncover the mechanism through which these factors produce welfare generosity outputs.
As suggested by a few studies (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Häusermann, Picot, & Geering,
2013), for example, parties may interact with other components of the political
environment or institutions to bring about change in state welfare generosity.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter is devoted to explain connections between the empirical results from
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and discuss pathways for future analysis. The two studies in
these chapters look at different dimensions of state welfare policy and they show some
commonalities and discrepancies in their results, especially regarding political forces. In
general, partisan control plays a role to influence both welfare commitment and generosity
at the state level. Except for the case where state welfare commitment is narrowly defined,
whether Democrats (or Republicans for Medicaid generosity) have full control over the
state government increases states’ willingness to devote their financial resources for public
welfare purposes and the degree of generosity to recipients of welfare benefits. On the other
hand, the two studies find that citizens’ ideological orientation is associated with neither
commitment nor generosity. Although citizen liberalism moderates the effect of either
inter-party competition or electoral competition in two generosity models (i.e., SSI-S and
Medicaid generosity), it does not have an independent effect on the generosity. Similarly,
the studies do not find a statistically significant effect of electoral competition in commitment
and generosity models except for the Medicaid generosity model. Electoral competition is
only meaningful when it is interacted with citizen liberalism in the Medicaid model.
Meanwhile, inter-party competition and government liberalism seem to exert
influence on welfare commitment, but they do not matter much for welfare generosity.
Inter-party competition has the impact of increasing state welfare commitment, albeit
with different degree, regardless of the commitment measure used. However, this same
variable matters only when it is conditioned by citizen ideology in the SSI-S generosity
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model. I reach a similar conclusion when it comes to the effect of government ideology.
Government liberalism leads to an increase in welfare commitment no matter how I define
welfare, but the only generosity model for which it shows the expected impact is the
TANF model.
Comparison across the results from state welfare commitment and generosity
models raise some questions that could be further examined in the future studies. First of
all, future research that provides theoretical underpinnings as to why some political
variables explain state welfare commitment but not generosity and vice versa will be
valuable. For example, inter-party competition is shown to have predicting power when it
comes to welfare commitment but not welfare generosity at least when the independent
effect of inter-party competition is concerned. The findings from SSI-S and Medicaid
generosity models that show the effect of inter-party being conditioned by citizen
ideology suggest one of the possibilities as to why we observe this discrepancy. One
might suspect that omission of the interaction term between inter-party competition and
citizen liberalism may lead to different findings with regard to these two factors. Whether
it is the matter of modeling or there are indeed fundamental differences in underlying
mechanisms in which these political variable works can be further tested.
Next, future efforts could focus on investigating similar questions addressed in
Chapter 4 with different measures of welfare generosity. The studies in Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4 suggest that different political forces might come into play when other
dimensions of the generosity of state welfare policy are taken into account. For example,
welfare generosity can be measured to reflect the extent to which a welfare policy
provides access to its benefits and services. Comparing results from examining different
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dimensions of welfare generosity would help disentangling the puzzles of differential
effects of political variables examined in these studies.
Lastly, further empirical tests that aim to uncover the effect of 1996 welfare
reform on state welfare policies will provide better understanding of welfare politics in
the post-welfare reform era. Scholars have taken the opportunity that the passage of
PRWORA created through the devolution of policy making power to states, which leads
to many studies focusing on variation in state welfare policy since 1996. While previous
studies draw on studies from the pre-welfare reform era, there is little attention to
whether the politics of welfare policy in American states actually has changed since the
1996 welfare reform. The PRWORA is viewed as the legislation that substantially
reconstructed the U.S. welfare system, but little is known what changes the welfare
reform brought about to the landscape of welfare policy making across states. It is
possible that both states’ greater discretion over designing and implementing welfare
programs and an emphasis on welfare-to-work change the political environment in which
various factors interact to produce policy outputs. A few studies that show the effects of
changes in social policy on political behavior suggest a possible pathway for political
effects that is worth exploring (Clinton & Sances, 2018; Lerman, Sadin, & Trachtman,
2017; Soss, 1999). Therefore, empirical studies comparing pre-1996 with post-1996 will
contribute to our understanding of welfare policy making that is more relevant to the
current policy environment. All future pathways for research suggested above will
provide theoretical refinement and advancement in the literature, which will, in turn,
serve as a sounder theoretical underpinning for future studies to come.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 2

State
TANF
Policy

1.00

Female
Legislators

0.01

1.00

Citizen
Liberalism

0.09

0.44

1.00

Government
Liberalism

-0.06

0.38

0.65

1.00

Unemploym
ent Rate

0.09

0.01

-0.02

0.07

1.00

Unwed
Birth Rate

0.11

-0.22

0.07

-0.00

0.37

1.00

Poverty Rate

0.00

-0.33

-0.28

-0.18

0.48

0.66

1.00

AfricanAmerican
Recipients

0.34

-0.34

-0.12

-0.06

0.22

0.47

0.28

1.00

Hispanic
Recipients

-0.17

0.34

0.12

0.07

0.11

0.00

0.11

-0.29

1.00

TANF
Caseload
Change

-0.09

0.13

0.05

0.21

0.28

-0.13

-0.04

-0.12

0.03

1.00

CCDF
Spending

-0.00

0.11

0.16

0.13

0.13

0.01

0.03

0.11

0.40

0.02

Note: Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number.
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CCDF Spending

TANF Caseload
Change

Hispanic
Recipients

African-American
Recipients

Poverty
Rate

Unwed
Birth Rate

Unemployment
Rate

Government
Liberalism

Citizen
Liberalism

Female Legislators

State
TANF Policy

Table A.1 Correlation Between Independent Variables

1.00

Table A.2 Results from Different Treatment of Negative Values of the Dependent
Variables a
Variables
Interaction
Female Legislators * TANF Policy

As is

Winsor

Trim

-0.38***
(0.13)

-0.37***
(0.12)

-0.26**
(0.11)

8.47***
(2.87)

8.30***
(2.73)

6.76**
(2.69)

0.27**
(0.12)
0.12**
(0.05)
0.09***
(0.03)

0.30***
(0.11)
0.13***
(0.05)
0.08***
(0.03)

0.26**
(0.11)
0.13***
(0.05)
0.07***
(0.03)

-0.55*
(0.30)
-0.16
(0.23)
0.19
(0.23)
0.04
(0.11)
0.35***
(0.11)

-0.57**
(0.28)
-0.17
(0.22)
0.12
(0.21)
0.06
(0.11)
0.34***
(0.11)

-0.62**
(0.28)
-0.12
(0.22)
0.10
(0.21)
0.07
(0.11)
0.34***
(0.10)

-0.03
(0.03)
6.85e-09***
(2.53e-09)

-0.03
(0.02)
6.26e-09***
(2.35e-09)

-0.04
(0.02)
5.57e-09**
(2.23e-09)

-0.45
(12.46)

-0.85
(12.06)

-1.50
(11.79)

Observations

650

650

637c

R-squared

0.84

0.85

0.84

Government Policy
State TANF Policy
Political Factors
Female Legislators
Citizen Liberalism
Government Liberalism
Socio-economic Factors
Unemployment Rate
Unwed Birth Rate
Poverty Rate
African-American Recipients
Hispanic Recipients
Controls
TANF Caseload Change
CCDF Spending b
Constant

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10
a. This table shows estimators from using three different data sets: negative values are (1) included as they
are, (2) winsorized, and (3) truncated at 1 and 99 percentiles, respectively. I conduct a robustness check to
insure that treating the nine negative values differently do not change the main results. The results for all
the variables remain the same in terms of their statistical significance and the direction of the impact.
b. The coefficients for CCDF Spending are statistically significant at the 1% level for first two models and
at the 5% level for the last model, but their size is minuscule. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the
result that CCDF Spending does not have a substantive marginal effect on TANF Child Care Spending.
c. By trimming extreme values of the dependent variable at 1 and 99 percentiles, thirteen observations were
deleted.
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APPENDIX B. SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for the Arellano-Bond
One should pass two post-estimation diagnostic tests to validate the use of the
Arellano-Bond estimator. First one is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. It tests
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of order 1 and order 2 (test separately).
For the instruments in the Arellano-Bond to work, the differenced unobserved timeinvariant error term should be unrelated to the second lag of the dependent variable and
the lags thereafter—i.e., the order greater than 1. If this is not the case, we have
endogeneity problem. Therefore, it is required that we fail to reject that there is no
autocorrelation of order 2. Second one is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. It
has a null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the
error term (exogenous). Therefore, we should fail to reject this hypothesis for the
instruments in the Arellano-Bond to be valid.
Table B.1 are the results from performing the diagnostic tests for each of the three
models using a different dependent variable. For all three models, condition for no
autocorrelation of order 2 is met as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero
autocorrelation of order 2. However, the results from the Sargan test indicate that the
instruments used in all models are not exogenous. It turns out that the three dependent
variables in each model are so highly correlated individually over time that the ArellanoBond estimators fail the test of instrument variables being uncorrelated with error terms.
Regressing the dependent variables on a one-year lagged dependent variable for the
period examined shows that about 94-96% of variance in the dependent variable is

114

explained by the lagged dependent variable in all of the three models. Therefore, the
Arellano-Bond is not an acceptable method of estimation for this study.
Table B.1 Arellano-Bond Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests
Model 1
(Census Measure)

Model 2
(Comprehensive
Measure 1)

Model 3
(Comprehensive
Measure 2)

AB test that autocorrelation of
order 1 is zero (Pr>z)

0.01

0.00

0.00

AB test that autocorrelation of
order 2 is zero (Pr>z)

0.55

0.98

0.83

Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions (p-value)

0.02

0.01

0.02

Table B.2 Variable Definitions and Sources of Data
Variable
State Welfare Commitment
(Model 1)
State Welfare Commitment
(Model 2)
State Welfare Commitment
(Model 3)

Unified Democrat Control

Unified Republican Control

Inter-Party Competition

Electoral Competition

Measure
Log of per capita total state welfare
expenditures, corresponding to
Census measure; constant 2010 U.S.
dollar
Log of per capita total state welfare
expenditures, corresponding to
Comprehensive measure 1; constant
2010 U.S. dollar
Log of per capita total state welfare
expenditures, corresponding to
Comprehensive measure 2; constant
2010 U.S. dollar
A dummy variable indicating
whether both the executive and
legislative branches are controlled by
Democrats
A dummy variable indicating
whether both the executive and
legislative branches are controlled by
Republicans
Folded Ranney (1976) index
indicating the degree of party control
of, and competition between two
parties for control of a state
government
Holbrook & Van Dunk (1993) index
indicating the average of legislative
district-level electoral competition in
a state
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Source
Pierson K., Hand M., and
Thompson F. (2015). The
Government Finance Database:
A Common Resource for
Quantitative Research in Public
Financial Analysis.
U.S. Census Bureau. (1998,
1999). State & Local
Government Finance Historical
Datasets and Tables (for FY
1998 and FY 1999).
Klarner, C. (2013b). State
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 2011.
Klarner, C. (2013b). State
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 2011.
Klarner, C. (2013a) Other
Scholars’ Competitiveness
Measures.
Klarner, C. (2013a) Other
Scholars’ Competitiveness
Measures.

Table B.2 (continued)
Variable
Government Liberalism

Measure
Berry et al. (2010) measure of
government ideology indicating the
relative liberalism of a state
government

Citizen Liberalism

Berry et al. (1998) measure of citizen
ideology indicating the relative
liberalism of state citizens

Income

Log of per capita state personal
income; 2010 constant U.S dollar

Unemployment

Percentage of state labor force who
are unemployed
Percentage of state population who
are 65 year old and above
Percentage of state population that is
African-American
Percentage of state population that is
Hispanic
Percentage of state population living
below the federal poverty level
Log of per capita total federal aid
transferred to a state, corresponding
to Census measure; includes federal
aid for TANF, Medicaid, care in
nursing homes, child welfare
services, social and community
services block grants, etc.; 2010
constant U.S. dollar
Log of per capita total federal aid
transferred to a state, corresponding
to Comprehensive measure 1;
includes Federal Aid 3 plus federal
aid for migrant and bilingual
education, Indian education, Head
Start program, federal grants for
school nutrition and milk programs,
grants and contractual amounts
received by higher education
institutions; 2010 constant U.S.
dollar

Elderly
African-American
Hispanic
Poverty
Federal Aid 1
(Model 1)

Federal Aid 2
(Model 2)
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Source
Berry, W. D., Fording, R.C.,
Ringquist, E. J., Hanson, R. L.,
& Klarner, C. (2010). Measuring
Citizen and Government
Ideology in the American States:
A Re-appraisal.
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J.,
Fording, R.C., & Hanson, R. L.
(1998). Measuring Citizen and
Government Ideology in the
American States, 1960-93.
U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
Pierson K., Hand M., and
Thompson F. (2015). The
Government Finance Database:
A Common Resource for
Quantitative Research in Public
Financial Analysis.

Table B.2 (continued)
Variable
Federal Aid 3
(Model 3)

Measure
Log of per capita total federal aid
transferred to a state, corresponding
to Comprehensive measure 2;
includes Federal Aid 1 plus federal
aid for administration of the
cooperative Federal-state
unemployment
compensation system, public
employment offices and related
services, and veterans’ readjustment
allowances, and determination of
eligibility for Social Security
disability benefits; 2010 constant
U.S. dollar

Source
Pierson K., Hand M., and
Thompson F. (2015). The
Government Finance Database:
A Common Resource for
Quantitative Research in Public
Financial Analysis.

Table B.3 Correlations
(1) Between Dependent Variables in State Welfare Commitment Models

Census Measure

1.00

Comprehensive
Measure 1
ㅡ

Comprehensive Measure 1

0.90

1.00

ㅡ

Comprehensive Measure 2

0.95

0.94

1.00

Census Measure

Note: Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number
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Comprehensive
Measure 2
ㅡ

Unified Dem. Control

1.00

Unified Rep. Control

-0.36

1.00

Inter-Party Competition

-0.30

-0.55

1.00

Electoral Competition

-0.10

0.03

0.05

1.00

Government Liberalism

0.60

-0.74

0.18

0.07

1.00

Citizen Liberalism

0.35

-0.31

0.05

0.21

0.51

1.00

Income

0.07

-0.16

0.18

0.17

0.28

0.53

1.00

Unemployment

0.06

-0.09

0.04

-0.11

0.11

0.03

-0.10

1.00

Elderly

0.13

-0.07

-0.04

-0.02

0.14

0.35

-0.05

-0.07

1.00

African-American

0.14

-0.17

0.14

-0.50

0.09

-0.12

-0.04

0.17

-0.08

1.00

Hispanic

-0.06

-0.02

0.02

-0.14

-0.03

0.06

0.12

0.14

-0.123

-0.13

1.00

Poverty

0.06

-0.09

-0.01

-0.42

-0.02

-0.20

-0.57

0.42

0.10

0.34

0.23

1.00

Federal Aid (Model 1)

0.16

-0.20

0.08

-0.05

0.30

0.27

-0.07

0.35

0.20

0.11

-0.13

0.40

1.00

Federal Aid (Model 2)

0.15

-0.15

0.01

-0.03

0.26

0.22

-0.10

0.36

0.11

0.06

-0.10

0.40

0.96

1.00

Federal Aid (Model 3)

0.16

-0.20

0.08

-0.05

0.30

0.27

-0.07

0.35

0.19

0.11

-0.13

0.40

1.00

0.96

Note: Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number.
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Federal Aid
(Model 3)

Federal Aid
(Model 2)

Federal Aid
(Model 1)

Poverty

Hispanic

AfricanAmerican

Elderly

Unemployment

Income

Citizen
Liberalism

Government
Liberalism

Electoral
Competition

Inter-Party
Competition

Unified
Rep. Control

Unified
Dem. Control

(2) Between Independent Variables

1.00

APPENDIX C. SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for the Arellano-Bond
Table C.1 provides the results from two post-estimation diagnostic tests which
validate the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator. First, the Arellano-Bond test for
autocorrelation shows whether there is no autocorrelation of order 1 and order 2,
respectively. One should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation
of order 2. If the differenced unobserved time-invariant error term is related to the second
lag of the dependent variable and the lags thereafter, we have endogeneity, which
indicates that the instruments in the Arellano-Bond would not work. Second, the Sargan
test shows whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and thus valid.
One should fail to reject this hypothesis. As shown in the table below, the use of
Arellano-Bond estimation is validated only for SSI-S generosity.
Table C.1 Results of Arellano-Bond Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests
TANF

SSI-S

Medicaid

AB test: autocorrelation of
order 1 is zero (Pr>z)

0.22

0.08

0.01

AB test: autocorrelation of
order 2 is zero (Pr>z)

0.25

0.43

0.45

<0.0001

0.99

0.0001

Sargan test of
overidentifying restrictions (p-value)
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Table C.2 Variable Definitions and Sources of Data
Variable
TANF Generosity

SSI-S Generosity

Medicaid Generosity

Measure
Per assistance recipient state total
TANF assistance expenditures
(FY1999-FY2010); constant 2010
U.S. dollar
Per recipient state total SSI-S
payments (FY2002-FY2004);
constant 2010 U.S. dollar
Per enrollee state total Medicaid
expenditures (FY2002-FY2010);
constant 2010 U.S. dollar

Government Liberalism

Folded Ranney (1976) index
indicating the degree of party control
of, and competition between two
parties for control of, a state
government folded Ranney (1976)
Index
Holbrook & Van Dunk (1993) index
indication the average of legislative
district-level electoral competition in
a state
A dummy variable indicating
whether both the executive and
legislative branches are controlled by
Democrats
A dummy variable indicating
whether both the executive and
legislative branches are controlled by
Republicans
Berry et al. (2010) measure of
government ideology indicating the
relative liberalism of a state
government

Citizen Liberalism

Berry et al. (2010) measure of citizen
ideology indicating the relative
liberalism of citizens

Income

Log of per capita state personal
income; constant 2010 U.S. dollar

Inter-Party Competition

Electoral Competition

Unified Democratic Control

Unified Republican Control

Unemployment
Wage
Federal Share (TANF)

Percentage of state labor force who
are unemployed
Log of annual earnings per worker
Percentage of federal contribution in
total TANF expenditures
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Source
Administration for Children
and Families (ACF), U.S.
Department of Health and
Human Services
U.S. Social Security
Administration
Medical Statistical Information
System (MSIS) database,
Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services
Klarner, C. (2013a) Other
Scholars’ Competitiveness
Measures.

Klarner, C. (2013a) Other
Scholars’ Competitiveness
Measures.
Klarner, C. (2013b). State
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 2011.
Klarner, C. (2013b). State
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 2011.
Berry, W. D., Fording, R.C.,
Ringquist, E. J., Hanson, R. L.,
& Klarner, C. (2010).
Measuring Citizen and
Government Ideology in the
American States: A Reappraisal.
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J.,
Fording, R.C., & Hanson, R.
L. (1998). Measuring Citizen
and Government Ideology in
the American States, 1960-93.
U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U.S. Department of
Commerce
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
Bureau of Economic Analysis,
U.S. Department of Commerce
Administration for Children
and Families (ACF), U.S.
Department of Health and
Human Services

Table C.2 (continued)
Variable
Federal Share (SSI-S)
Federal Share (Medicaid)

TANF Caseloads
SSI-S Recipients
Medicaid Enrollees
Nursing Homes
Hospitals
Doctors
African-American
Hispanic
Poverty
Single Mother Household
Non-Marital Birth
Disability
Elderly
Children

Measure
Percentage of federal contribution in
total SSI expenditures
The rate at which the federal
government match state Medicaid
expenditures (aka FMAP)
Percentage of state total annual
TANF caseloads in total state female
population aged 15-44
Percentage of state population
receiving SSI-S payments
Percentage of state population
enrolled in Medicaid
The number of nursing homes per
100,000 (100K) residents
The number of community hospitals
per 100,000 (100K) residents
The number of physicians per
100,000 (100K) residents
Percentage of state population that is
African-American
Percentage of state population that is
Hispanic
Percentage of state population living
below the federal poverty level
Percentage of single mother headed
households in a state
Percentage of births out of wed-lock
in a state
Percentage of state population who
has working disabilities
Percentage of state population who is
65 and over
Percentage of state population who is
under 18
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Source
U.S. Social Security
Administration
Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Planning and
Evaluation, Department of
Health and Human Services
U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services
U.S. Social Security
Administration
Medical Statistical Information
System (MSIS) database,
Center for Medicare &
Medicaid Services
Center for Disease Control and
Prevention
U.S. Statistical Abstract and
Kaiser Family Foundation
U.S. Statistical Abstract
U.S. Census Bureau
U.S. Census Bureau
Center for Poverty Research,
University of Kentucky
U.S. Census Bureau
Kids Count Data Center
Disability Statistics, Cornell
University
U.S. Census Bureau
Kids Count Data Center

Table C.3. Correlations Between Independent Variables

Inter-Party Competition

1.00

Electoral Competition

0.05

1.00

Unified Dem. Control

-0.30

-0.09

1.00

Unified Rep. Control

-0.55

0.03

-0.36

1.00

Government Liberalism

0.18

0.07

0.60

-0.74

1.00

Citizen Liberalism

0.05

0.21

0.35

-0.31

0.51

1.00

Income

0.18

0.17

0.07

-0.16

0.28

0.53

1.00

Wage

0.19

0.15

0.12

-0.22

0.34

0.51

0.85

1.00

Unemployment

0.04

-0.11

0.06

-0.09

0.11

0.03

-0.10

0.15

1.00

TANF Caseloads (t-1)

0.19

0.18

0.15

-0.33

0.38

0.36

0.08

0.29

0.05

1.00

TANF Caseloads (t-2)

0.18

0.16

0.13

-0.29

0.33

0.32

0.06

0.25

-0.03

0.96

1.00

Federal Share

-0.10

-0.16

-0.05

-0.12

-0.21

-0.35

-0.55

-0.55

-0.02

-0.16

-0.18

1.00

African-American

0.14

-0.50

0.14

-0.17

0.09

-0.12

-0.04

0.02

0.17

-0.12

-0.08

0.06

1.00

Hispanic

0.02

-0.14

-0.06

-0.02

-0.03

0.06

0.12

0.23

0.14

0.11

0.10

-0.06

-0.13

1.00

Single Mother Household

0.11

-0.33

0.07

-0.14

0.03

-0.14

-0.28

-0.19

0.21

0.09

0.11

0.20

0.50

-0.05

1.00

Non-Marital Birth

0.18

-0.41

0.10

-0.22

0.18

0.12

-0.12

-0.15

0.37

0.04

0.02

0.10

0.53

0.20

0.49

1.00

Poverty

-0.01

-0.42

0.06

-0.09

-0.02

-0.20

-0.57

-0.45

0.42

0.05

0.05

0.37

0.34

0.23

0.44

0.58

Note: All variables except TANF Caseloads (t-2) are lagged by one year. Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number.
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Poverty

Non-Marital
Birth

Single Mother
Household

Hispanic

AfricanAmerican

Federal Share

TANF
Caseloads (t-2)

TANF
Caseloads (t-1)

Unemployment

Wage

Income

Citizen
Liberalism

Government
Liberalism

Unified
Rep. Control

Unified
Dem. Control

Electoral
Competition

Inter-Party
Competition

(1) TANF Generosity Model, FY1999-FY 2010

1.00

SSI-S (t-1)

1.00

Inter-Party Competition

0.22

1.00

Electoral Competition

0.10

0.10

1.00

Unified Dem. Control

0.04

-0.28

-0.26

1.00

Unified Rep. Control

-0.18

-0.53

0.11

-0.32

1.00

Government Liberalism

0.27

0.21

0.04

0.52

-0.69

1.00

Citizen Liberalism

0.04

0.17

0.17

0.26

-0.31

0.47

1.00

Income

0.22

0.27

0.21

-0.04

-0.13

0.25

0.49

1.00

Wage

0.31

0.25

0.22

0.02

-0.15

0.33

0.48

0.89

1.00

Unemployment

0.17

0.07

-0.06

0.05

-0.05

0.13

-0.16

-0.20

0.13

1.00

SSI-S Recipients (t-1)

-0.12

0.10

0.23

-0.02

-0.05

0.24

0.43

0.45

0.50

0.01

1.00

SSI-S Recipients (t-2)

-0.04

0.08

0.26

0.01

-0.06

0.25

0.45

0.46

0.52

0.03

0.98

1.00

Federal Share

-0.16

0.09

-0.30

0.13

0.02

-0.16

-0.18

-0.44

-0.49

-0.11

-0.64

-0.62

1.00

African-American

0.04

-0.14

-0.49

0.28

-0.21

0.21

-0.14

-0.02

0.00

0.16

-0.28

-0.30

0.24

1.00

Hispanic

-0.06

0.06

-0.06

-0.15

-0.08

0.01

0.05

0.07

0.18

0.22

0.05

0.04

-0.03

-0.16

1.00

Disability

-0.05

-0.06

-0.15

0.30

-0.13

0.20

-0.11

-0.51

-0.42

0.26

-0.06

-0.06

0.22

0.15

-0.34

1.00

Elderly

-0.17

-0.05

-0.11

0.10

-0.08

0.04

0.36

-0.04

-0.21

-0.28

0.02

0.03

0.21

-0.06

-0.21

0.28

1.00

Poverty

-0.13

-0.11

-0.45

0.22

-0.18

0.12

-0.20

-0.66

-0.49

0.40

-0.23

-0.24

0.33

0.33

0.22

0.59

0.11

Note: All variables except SSI-S Recipients (t-2) are lagged by one year. Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number.
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Poverty

Elderly

Disability

Hispanic

AfricanAmerican

Federal Share

SSI-S
Recipients (t-2)

SSI-S
Recipients (t-1)

Unemployment

Wage

Income

Citizen
Liberalism

Government
Liberalism

Unified
Rep. Control

Unified
Dem. Control

Electoral
Competition

Inter-Party
Competition

SSI-S (t-1)

(2) SSI-S Generosity Model, FY 2002-FY 2004

1.00

Inter-Party Competition

1.00

Electoral Competition

0.06

1.00

Unified Dem. Control

-0.31

-0.06

1.00

Unified Rep. Control

-0.52

0.00

-0.36

1.00

Government Liberalism

0.16

0.08

0.61

-0.74

1.00

Citizen Liberalism

0.04

0.23

0.35

-0.35

0.53

1.00

Nursing Homes

-0.10

0.14

-0.10

0.09

-0.08

-0.06

Hospitals

-0.23

0.18

-0.18

0.31

-0.25

-0.30

0.74

1.00

Doctors

0.04

0.04

0.33

-0.30

0.44

0.75

-0.17

-0.43

1.00

Income

0.16

0.17

0.11

-0.17

0.29

0.52

-0.20

-0.37

0.69

1.00

Unemployment

0.06

-0.10

0.05

-0.07

0.09

-0.02

-0.26

-0.25

0.00

-0.16

1.00

Medicaid Enrollees (t-1)

0.08

-0.30

0.15

-0.27

0.28

0.15

-0.11

-0.13

0.09

-0.23

0.28

1.00

Medicaid Enrollees (t-2)

0.07

-0.29

0.16

-0.25

0.28

0.16

-0.12

-0.12

0.10

-0.21

0.25

0.96

1.00

Federal Share

-0.23

-0.22

-0.04

0.16

-0.22

-0.44

0.27

0.47

-0.57

-0.88

0.03

0.31

0.31

African-American

0.12

-0.52

0.11

-0.13

0.04

-0.14

-0.26

-0.32

0.07

-0.05

0.20

0.28

0.27

0.07

1.00

Hispanic

-0.03

-0.16

0.00

-0.02

-0.01

0.04

-0.44

-0.37

-0.01

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.09

-0.16

-0.13

1.00

Disability

0.07

-0.18

0.18

-0.18

0.17

-0.07

0.07

0.13

-0.16

-0.45

0.24

0.50

0.51

0.53

0.22

-0.34

1.00

Elderly

-0.01

0.01

0.13

-0.16

0.20

0.36

0.46

0.18

0.16

-0.05

-0.07

0.11

0.11

0.14

-0.08

-0.24

0.27

1.00

Children

-0.14

-0.10

-0.30

0.33

-0.42

-0.60

-0.17

0.03

-0.45

-0.29

-0.00

-0.12

-0.14

0.21

0.04

0.29

-0.31

-0.75

1.00

Poverty

-0.02

-0.44

0.05

-0.08

-0.02

-0.24

-0.04

0.10

-0.29

-0.60

0.40

0.58

0.56

0.62

0.37

0.21

0.55

0.10

0.07

Poverty

Children

Elderly

Disability

Hispanic

AfricanAmerican

Federal Match

Medicaid
Enrollees (t-2)

Medicaid
Enrollees (t-1)

Unemployment

Income

Doctors

Hospitals

Nursing Homes

Citizen
Liberalism

Government
Liberalism

Unified
Rep. Control

Unified
Dem. Control

Electoral
Competition

Inter-Party
Competition

(3) Medicaid Generosity Model, FY 2002-FY 2010

1.00

1.00

1.00

Note: The statistics are for original variables, not differenced variables. All variables except Medicaid Enrollees (t-2) are lagged by one year. Correlation values
are rounded to the second decimal number.
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